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The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality
of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model
of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities
in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given
population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory
and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features
of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we


























Suppose new oil is discovered in a country, or more funds are transfered to a locality from
a higher level of government. Are these windfalls of resources unambiguously beneﬁcial to
society? This is a key question in the study of a variety of issues in macroeconomics and
development economics, such as intergovernmental relations, transfers to lagging regions
like the European Union’s Structural Funds, and international aid to developing countries.
Until a few years ago, the only reason for a negative answer to this question would
have been provided by the “Dutch disease literature:” a natural resource windfall, such
as oil revenues, can lead to a decline in income via a market mechanism, notably an
appreciation of the real exchange rate. In the last few years a growing literature, and
much anecdotal evidence, has argued that a windfall of natural resources can have further
adverse eﬀects through the political process and the interaction among interest groups,
leading for instance to increased rent-seeking (as in the dynamic common pool models of
Tornell and Lane, 1999; and Velasco, 1999) or even to civil war (as in Besley and Persson,
2008; Caselli and Coleman, 2008; and Ross, 2006).1
In this paper, we argue that windfall government revenuescan worsen the functioning of
political institutions, because they exacerbate the political agency problem and deteriorate
the quality of political candidates. This idea has been voiced before in policy debates, for
instance with reference to the Italian South (Rossi, 2006), but without spelling out a
precise mechanism and only on the basis of anecdotal evidence. Here we show that it is
supported by both rigorous theory and systematic evidence.
The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous
entry of political candidates. The model focuses on the electoral competition between
an incumbent and a set of challengers, all with diﬀerent political abilities and diﬀerent
opportunity costs of entering politics. The incumbent faces a trade-oﬀ between using
public resources for personal gains (corruption) and maximizingthe probability of election.
Although the model has been studied before (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), we emphasize
some new implications on the eﬀects of a windfall of revenues, and we extend it to allow
for endogenous entry and selection of political candidates with diﬀerent abilities.
1See also Ross (1999), Rosser (2006), and the references cited therein.
1The model highlights three speciﬁc channels of operation of windfall government rev-
enues through the political process. First, an increase in resources available to a govern-
ment leads to an increase in corruption of the incumbent (a moral hazard eﬀect). This
happens because, with a larger budget size, the incumbent has more room to grab politi-
cal rents without disappointing rational but imperfectly informed voters. Second, a larger
budget induces a decline in the average ability of the pool of individuals entering politics
(a selection eﬀect). This is a byproduct of the ﬁrst result (that rents increase with bud-
get size) and of the assumption that political rents tend to be more valuable for political
candidates of lower ability. Third, there is an interaction between these two eﬀects that
further increases the adverse consequences of a windfall of revenues on political corrup-
tion: an incumbent facing less able opponents can marginally grab more rents without
hurting his reelection prospects. Finally, the selection eﬀect highlighted above also implies
that windfall revenues increase the equilibrium probability of reelection of the incumbent,
despite his grabbing more rents.
We then test the implications of this model on micro data from a sample of Brazilian
municipalities. The obvious problem in testing the eﬀects of government revenues is, as
always, how to identify exogenous changes: one can think of a number of reasons why
local government revenues might be correlated with corruption and the composition of the
pool of politicians. For instance, corrupt politicians might have a comparative advantage
in obtaining higher transfers from other levels of government; or poorer areas might select
low-quality politicians and, at the same time, receive more transfers for redistribution
purposes. To address this endogeneity issue, we combine three diﬀerent datasets. The
ﬁrst contains information on a program of federal transfers to municipal governments,
determined in a stochastic but discontinuous fashion by population size; the second con-
sists of data on a program of random audits on local governments, with detailed reports
on corruption charges; the third provides biographical and electoral information on the
incumbent mayors and their opponents in municipal elections.
We exploit a key feature of the federal transfers program: all municipalities in the
same state and in a given population bracket should receive the same amount of trans-
fers. Indeed, although in the data there exist multiple cases of misassignments around
the policy thresholds, the amount of federal transfers received by municipal governments
2displays visible jumps at each threshold. We therefore use a (fuzzy) regression discontinu-
ity approach—with population discontinuities as an instrument for the transfers actually
received—to study the impact of a discrete change in revenues between municipalities just
above or below the thresholds on the corruption of the incumbent mayors (as measured by
the random audit program) and on the composition of the pool of opponents (as captured
by their years of schooling and private sector occupation).
The empirical ﬁndings accord well with the implications of the theory. Speciﬁcally, an
(exogenous) increase in federal transfers by 10% raises the incidence of a broad measure of
corruption by 12 percentage points (about 17% with respect to the average incidence), and
the incidence of a more restrictive measure—including only severe violation episodes—by
10.1 percentage points (about 24%). At the same time, larger transfers (by 10%) worsen
the quality of the political candidates challenging the incumbent, decreasing the fraction
of opponents with at least a college degree by 3 percentage points (about 7%). As a
result, the incumbent who receives higher transfers experiences a raise in his probability
of reelection by 4.1 percentage points (about 7%).
At the theoretical level, our paper combines three separate strands of literature, besides
the career concerns model discussed by Persson and Tabellini (2000). The ﬁrst is the
literature on windfall resources and rent-seeking mentioned above. Our closest antecedent
here is Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006), who use a partisan model with patronage
to study the optimal extraction of resources and the optimal patronage by a government
facing reelection. A second strand of literature studies the selection of politicians, and
how diﬀerent institutions aﬀect the pool of elected oﬃcials and candidates (Besley, 2004;
Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Besley and Smart, 2007; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008; Galasso
and Nannicini, 2009). A third, older strand of literature studies the allocation of talents
in economies characterized by diﬀerent incentives to diﬀerent types of talents (Baumol,
1990; Murphy, Vishny, and Shleifer, 1991).
With regard to the evidence, to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to estimate the eﬀect
of transfers from a higher level of government on political corruption and on the quality of
politicians of local governments. Each one of the above three Brazilian datasets has been
used before to study related outcomes, but they have never been combined and they have
not been used to study how federal transfers aﬀect political corruption and the features
3of candidates for mayor. Litschig (2008a) is our closest antecedent: he uses the same
Brazilian dataset on federal transfers and a similar regression discontinuity methodology
to show that higher federal transfers increase municipal spending on public schools and
improve literacy rate outcomes. Although he does not talk about corruption, his ﬁndings
are consistent with ours. Litschig and Morrison (2009) use the same approach and data for
the municipal term 1984–88 to estimate the impact of federal transfers on the reelection
probability of the incumbent party in mayoral elections, detecting a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Using a tailored household survey, Vicente (2009) shows that the discovery of oil
in the island of S˜ ao Tom´ e and Principe was associated with a signiﬁcant rise in perceived
corruption, relative to the control island of Capo Verde. Caselli and Michaels (2009)
show that oil discoveries in Brazilian municipalities have a positive impact on public
good spending, but little or no eﬀect on the quality of public good provision. They
also provide indirect evidence that this might be due to rent-seeking and corruption.
Ferraz and Finnan (2008, 2009a) use instead the dataset on randomized audits to study,
respectively, the eﬀect of corruption disclosure on the election outcome and the eﬀect
of electoral accountability on political corruption: they ﬁnd that mayors found to be
corrupt have a lower reelection probability, and that municipalities where mayors can
be reelected experience less corruption. Brollo (2008) uses similar data and ﬁnds that
corrupt municipalitiesare also punished by a reduction inthe (discretionary) infrastructure
transfers they receive from higher levels of government after the release of the reports.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature on political selection, which has focused
on the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives on the decision of citizens to
run for an elective oﬃce (Diermeir, Keane, and Merlo, 2005; Messner and Polborn, 2004;
Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni, 2008; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2009; Ferraz
and Finan, 2009b). So far, however, this literature has not investigated how the quality of
political candidates is aﬀected by the size of the government budget or by transfers from
higher levels of government.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and derives its
empirical implications. Section 3 discusses the relevant Brazilian institutions and describes
the data. Section 4 illustrates the econometric strategy. Section 5 presents a number of
validity tests and the estimation results. We conclude with Section 6.
42 Theory
2.1 A career concerns model
This section studies a version of the “career concerns” model of Persson and Tabellini
(2000). In order to focus on the selection of politicians, we extend that framework by
introducing diﬀerences in the ability of candidates and endogenous entry into politics.
Although that model can be formulated with an inﬁnite horizon (see Section 4.5.2 in
Persson and Tabellini, 2000), for simplicity we assume only two periods. Throughout, we
refer to the politician in oﬃce as the incumbent mayor.
In the ﬁrst period (t = 1) an incumbent mayor sets policy for that period. Then
elections are held, and the elected mayor sets policy once more for a second (t = 2) and
last period. In both periods, a budget of ﬁxed size τ can be allocated to two alternative
uses: rents rt that only beneﬁt the mayor; and a public good gt that only beneﬁts the
voters. The cost of providing the public good depends on the identity of the mayor, and
more competent mayors can provide the same public good (expressed in terms of voters’
utility) at a lower resource cost. Speciﬁcally, the government budget constraint is:
gt = θ(τ − rt) (1)
where θ reﬂects an individual’s competence (if elected to oﬃce) in providing the public
good: a higher value of θ corresponds to a lower cost of providing the public good, and
hence a more competent mayor. Thus, the policy can be thought of as rents (rt) captured
by the mayor in that period, while the public good gt is residually determined from the
budget constraint.
We assume political competence to be a random but permanent feature of an individual.
Speciﬁcally, θ is a random variable uniformly distributedwith density ξ and a known mean.
The realization of θ is drawn from two alternative distributions, with the same density
but diﬀerent means, depending on the individual’s type. Speciﬁcally, for an individual of
type J the mean of θ is 1 + σJ, where J = H,L, and σH = σ = −σL, with 1 > σ > 0 a
known parameter. Thus, individuals of type H on average are more competent if elected
to oﬃce. But in speciﬁc instances it could very well be that the actual competence of an
individual of type H is lower than that of an individual of type L.2
2Under our assumptions, the range of realizations of θ for type J is: [1+σJ− 1
2ξ,1+σJ+ 1
2ξ], J = H,L.
5In keeping with the career concerns model, we assume that the realization of θ becomes
known to each individual, and also to voters if that individual is elected to oﬃce and
becomes mayor, only at the end of period 1. The mayor’s type is known beforehand to
everyone, however. At the time of elections, voters also observe their own utility (i.e., the
public good g1), but do not observe political rents. All the parameters of the model are
known to the voters.
This formulation captures two important features of political agency conﬂicts. On the
one hand, as in the standard career concerns model, the voters’ imperfect information
about the incumbent’s true competence creates an incentive for the incumbent to please
the voters through public good provision, so as to appear competent. On the other hand,
not all politicians are ex-ante identical: voters know something about political candidates,
besides what is learned by observing policy outcomes. Throughout this section we refer
to the mayor’s type J as simply high or low quality, but more generally J stands for
any observable variable (other than policy outcomes) that enables voters to predict the
mayor’s performance if elected. In the empirical section, we measure J by the politicians’
education or market experience. For now, the politician’s type is exogenous. In the next
subsection, we make it endogenous by analyzing the entry decision of candidates.
In line with the institutions in Brazil, we assume that rent-seeking (corruption) by the
mayor is discouraged by an audit technology. Speciﬁcally, with probability d(rt) = qrt
a mayor who grabbed political rents rt is caught and suﬀers utility loss of λJ, where
λH > λL > 0.3 Thus, the loss of utility for a high quality mayor who is caught cheating
is harsher. This assumption plays a crucial role below, where we analyze the entry of
political candidates, and it is further discussed there. It is meant to capture the idea
that a highly educated or very talented politician has more valuable opportunities outside
of politics. Hence, for such a politician the reputation cost of being caught in an act of
corruption is higher than for someone with lower opportunity costs from being in politics.
As standard in the literature on political agency, politicians care about political rents
(net of the expected penalty), and enjoy other exogenous beneﬁts from being in oﬃce (ego
rents), summarized by the exogenous variable R. Thus, the expected utility of a mayor of
3As explained in footnote 5 below, the results of interest would be reinforced if we assumed that the
probability of being caught depends on the fraction of the budget devoted to rents (rather than on the
absolute amount of rents as assumed here).












where αJ = 1− λJq denotes the expected value of political rents for type J, and pJ is the
probability of being reelected, as perceived by the incumbent in period 1, when setting
the optimal rent r1. We assume that λJ < 1, so that αJ > 0 for all J.
Voters only care about the public good, hence their preferences in each period are:
Wt = gt (4)
Finally, we assume that rents cannot exceed a given upper bound that depends on the
size of the budget, namely:
rt ≤ ψτ ≡ r (5)
The timing of events is as follows:
- At the start of period 1, the incumbent sets r1. He knows his own type, but he
does not yet know the actual realization of his competence, θ, nor the identity of his
future opponent. Speciﬁcally, the incumbent expects his opponent to be of type L
with probability π, and of type H with probability 1 − π, where for now 1 > π > 0
is given, but will be endogenized later (the assumption that the incumbent does not
yet know his opponent’s identity is made to simplify notation and with no loss of
generality).
- The identity of the opponent is revealed and his type H or L (but not the actual
realization of his competence θ) becomes known to all.
- Elections are held. When voting, voters observe g1, but not r1. They also know the
incumbent’s as well as the opponent’s type. After the elections, the audit takes place
and the penalty is paid (if cheating is detected).
- In period 2 the elected mayor sets r2, and then a second and ﬁnal audit takes place.
72.2 Equilibrium rents
To solve the model, we work backwards. In the last period, whoever is in oﬃce sets
maximal rents. This follows from the assumption that the expected penalty is insuﬃcient
to deter corruption (αJ > 0 for all J). Hence, r2 = ¯ r ≡ ψτ irrespective of who is elected.
Next, consider the voters’ behavior in period 1. Since the period 2 policy is the same
irrespective of who is in oﬃce, voters only care about competence, and they vote for the
candidate with the higher expected competence. Thus, an incumbent of type J wins
against an opponent of type O if:
E(θ|g1,J) ≥ 1 + σ
O J,O = H,L (6)
where the left hand side of (6) is the expected value of θ conditional on the voters obser-
vation of g1 and their knowledge of the incumbent’s type J, while the right hand side is
the unconditional mean of θ for an opponent of type O.







1 denotes the voter’s expectation of how an incumbent of type J sets rents in









1 denotes the rents actually set by a type J incumbent. Thus, by (6)-(8), an
incumbent of type J running against an opponent of type O wins the election with prob-
ability
p


















where the ﬁrst equation follows from (6)-(8), and the second equation from the assumption
about the distribution of θ.4
4Speciﬁcally, given that θ is drawn from a uniform distribution with density ξ and mean 1 + σJ,
Pr[θ > X] =
1
2
+ ξ(1 + σJ − X)
8When the incumbent sets policy, however, he does not yet know the identity of his
future opponent, and he assigns probabilities π and 1−π to the events that the opponent
will be of type L and H, respectively. Thus, as perceived by the incumbent when choosing











(1 + ˆ σ) (11)
where ˆ σ is the expected competence of the opponent, as perceived by the incumbent when
setting rents in period 1:
1 + ˆ σ ≡ 1 + σ(1 − 2π) (12)
We are now ready to discuss the determination of public policy in period 1. The incum-
bent maximizes (3) with respect to r1, subject to (11) and, by the incentive compatibility
condition, taking the voters expectations reJ
1 as given. At an interior optimum, the ﬁrst










2 = 0 (13)




Jr + R ≡ α
Jψτ + R (14)
Taking the partial derivative of pJ with respect to rJ
1, for a given value of reJ
1 , and then
imposing the equilibrium condition that reJ
1 = rJ









Thus, a higher rent reduces the probability of reelectionbecause it reducesg1 and therefore,
given reJ
1 , the voters’ estimate of the incumbent’s ability. We call the absolute value of
(15) the “electoral punishment” of the marginal rent.




1 = τ − ξ(1 + ˆ σ)(ψτ + R/α
J) (16)
where, to have an interior optimum, we implicitly assume that the right hand side of
(16) is positive. We call this the “partial equilibrium” rent, to emphasize the fact that
9it is conditional on a given expected competence of the opponent ˆ σ; later we will endo-
genize ˆ σ. For future reference, we call the expression (ψτ + R/αJ) “value of reelection”
and the expression ξ(1 + ˆ σ) “electoral threshold” (strictly speaking, these expressions are
transformations of the expressions capturing these concepts). Thus, at an optimum the
incumbent grabs the whole budget less a quantity that is a function of the electoral thresh-
old times the value of reelection. Intuitively, a higher electoral threshold (i.e., a higher
expected competence of the opponent) reduces the rent because, from (15), it increases
the electoral punishment of the marginal rent.
Finally, imposing the equilibrium condition that actual and expected rents coincide,








where we have used (10) and the “*” superscript denotes equilibrium. Correspondingly,







J − ˆ σ) (18)
Note that these equilibrium probabilities only depend on the diﬀerence in expected com-
petence between the incumbent and the (actual or expected) opponent. Intuitively, voters
have the same information as the incumbent. Hence, they correctly guess political rents
and the incumbent’s true competence. In equilibrium, election outcomes are only de-
termined by the relative expected competence of the two candidates, and not by actual
policies. Nevertheless, electoral incentives exert a powerful inﬂuence on public policies.
We can now state the main properties of the equilibrium, giving particular emphasis
to the eﬀects of a larger budget size, since these are the implications that are tested in the
empirical analysis below. We conﬁne attention to period 1, which is more interesting.




This is an immediate implication of (16), together with the assumptions needed to
have strictly positive rents at an interior optimum. Intuitively, the electoral punishment
for rents,
∂pJ
∂r1, becomes smaller in absolute value as τ rises (see equation 15). This in turn
is implied by how voters form their inferences: from (8), as the budget grows in size, a
10dollar stolen has a smaller impact on voters’ inferences about the incumbent’s unobserved
ability. At the margin, this diminishes the incentive of political incumbents to please the
voters. This result is quite intuitive: if the budget size is very large, there is more room
to grab political rents without disappointing the voters.5
Proposition 2 Rents are a decreasing function of the expected competence of the opponent:
∂rJ
1
∂ˆ σ < 0.
This result too follows immediately from (16) and (15). From (6), the expectation
of a more competent opponent entails a higher competence threshold to reappoint the
incumbent, and reduces the probability of reappointment, for any level of rents consistent
with voters’ expectations. At this higher reelection threshold, the probability of winning
the election is more sensitive to political rents (see equation 11). This sharpens the
incumbent’s incentive to please the voters, and as a result equilibrium rents fall. Note
that the expected competence of the opponent (as perceived by the incumbent) in turn
depends on π, the probability that the opponent is a low quality type. Thus, the higher
is this probability, the lower is the expected quality of the opponent and the higher are
equilibrium rents.
Proposition 3 The eﬀect of budget size on rents is larger the lower is the expected com-
petence of the opponent:
∂2rJ
1
∂τ∂ˆ σ < 0.
This interaction eﬀect between τ and ˆ σ reﬂects the same forces that account for the
previous two propositions. Intuitively, when the budget size increases by one dollar, we
know from (16) that the incumbent grabs the extra dollar less a quantity which is a
function of the electoral threshold times the value of reelection; hence, a higher expected
competence of the opponent (a higher electoral threshold) reduces the share of the extra
dollar of budget that the politician appropriates. Not only does a larger budget size
5Note that, almost by assumption, period 2 rents are also an increasing function of budget size. This
dampens the eﬀect of budget size on period 1 rents, because it raises the value of reelection, but (at an
interior optimum) it is not enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of τ on rJ




is also easy to see that Proposition 1 would be strengthened if we assumed that the probability of being
caught was increasing in the fraction of the budget devoted to rents (d(rt) = qrt/τ), rather than in the
absolute amount of rents (d(rt) = qrt). Intuitively, under the alternative assumption, a larger budget
would reduce the probability of detection, inducing the incumbent mayor to grab even more rents.
11increase political rents (Proposition 1), but it also does so to a larger extent if the opponent
is more likely to be of low quality (if ˆ σ is small or, equivalently, if π is large).
2.3 The quality of political candidates
The model emphasizes the role of elections in selecting the more competent candidate, and
the implied eﬀects on the incumbent’s incentives. But the pool of candidates was taken
to be exogenous, neglecting how individuals respond to incentives in deciding whether or
not to stand as a political candidate. In this subsection we address this issue, and allow
the proportion of high and low quality types in the pool of candidates to be determined
endogenously in equilibrium. For this we need additional assumptions.
Let 2N be the overall population, with N a discrete large number. In the population
there are two groups of individuals indexed by J = H,L, with each group of size N. All
the assumptions outlined above continue to hold. In particular, if an individual in group
J holds oﬃce, his competence is drawn from a uniform distribution with mean 1 + σJ.
Within each group, individuals diﬀer by the opportunity cost of entering into politics:
individual i in group J has opportunity cost βiyJ, for i = 1,2...N. To simplify the algebra,
we assume that βi = i. Thus, for the ﬁrst individual in group J the opportunity cost of
being into politics is yJ, for the second individual it is 2yJ, and so on until the last one
has opportunity cost NyJ. Throughout we assume that yH > yL > 0. Thus, consistently
with the previous political interpretation, high quality individuals (J = H) have a higher
expected competence if they become mayor and also have a higher opportunity cost of
being in politics. The parameter βi instead is unrelated to political competence, so that
the relationship between political competence and the opportunity cost of being in politics
is not one for one. This formulation captures the idea that political competence is related
to features, such as education or sheer talent, that also make an individual more productive
in the private sector. But the decision to enter politics also reﬂects other considerations
besides income, and the skills needed to be a successful politician do not coincide with
those that yield high income or success in other professions. The positive correlation
between market skills (outside opportunities) and political competence is common in the
models on political self-selection, such as Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Besley (2004).
At the start of period 1, individuals decide whether or not to enter politics. Entering
12politics means that, with some probability, the individual is selected to run as the single
opponent to the incumbent mayor in the elections that are held at the end of period
1. In other words, entering politics is equivalent to entering the pool of candidates from
which the opponent is selected. We do not model how parties select a hierarchy of political
candidates, and simply assume that all individuals in the pool of candidates have the same
probability to be selected as the opponent, irrespective of their types J and i. Speciﬁcally,
suppose that nJ individuals from group J have decided to enter politics, J = H,L. Then
the pool of candidates has size n = nH + nL, and each one of them has probability 1
n to
become the single opponent who will challenge the incumbent. This captures the notion
that not all politicians get a chance to become serious political candidates for mayor.
To simplify the notation and with no loss of generality, we also assume that, when
deciding whether or not to enter politics, individuals know their own type but do not
know yet the identity of the incumbent and assign equal probabilities to the event that
the incumbent is of type H or L. Thus, by (17) in the previous subsection, the expected
probability that an opponent of type J wins the election is (1/2 + ξσJ), where with a
slight abuse of notation here we use the symbol J to denote the opponent (rather than
the incumbent) type.
Under these assumptions, if individual i in group J stays out of politics, then he gets
utility iyJ. If he enters politics, then with probability
1
n he is selected to become the
opponent, and with probability (1/2+ξσJ) he wins the election and gains oﬃce in period
2. By the notation in the previous subsection, the expected utility of being in oﬃce in
period 2 for an individual of type J is V J
2 . A political candidate who loses the election or
is not selected to be the opponent, gets zero utility.














































, J = H,L (22)
Hence, the share of L types in the pool of opponents is:
π =
nL

















Note that π ≶
1
2. This is intuitive: high quality individuals have higher opportunity costs
(yH > yL) and lower expected beneﬁts from being in oﬃce (V H
2 < V L
2 ), but they also
have higher probability of winning against the yet unknown incumbent, so the net eﬀect
of these forces is ambiguous.
We now brieﬂy discuss the properties of π, again focusing on the eﬀect of budget size.
Proposition 4 The fraction of low quality types in the pool of opponents is an increasing
function of budget size:
∂π
∂τ > 0.



















L) < 0 (25)
which in turn implies that ∂π/∂τ > 0—see (23-24). In words, a larger budget size τ leads
to a worse composition of the pool of opponents. Intuitively, because the value of rents
is higher for the low quality mayors, a larger budget increases the value of oﬃce by more
for the low quality than for the high quality candidates. Hence, at the margin more low
quality candidates enter the pool of opponents, deteriorating the composition.
This result reﬂects two important assumptions in the model. First, we assumed that
the penalty if caught is higher for a high quality type (λH > λL), which implies that rents
are less valuable for a high quality type (αH < αL). If this assumption were reversed, the
empirical implication too would be the opposite. Thus, although we ﬁnd our assumption a
14priori plausible, it can be jointly tested with the model. Second, the model focuses on the
decision of individual candidates to enter politics, but it has nothing to say on how parties
select amongst alternative candidates (since we assumed that all prospective candidates
have the same probability 1/n of running as the opponent). Without a richer model of
intra-party politics it is diﬃcult to assess how restrictive this omission is.6
2.4 The total eﬀect of budget size
Putting it all together, we can now determine the total eﬀect of budget size, taking into
account also its eﬀects on the quality of the opponents. Combining (16) with the deﬁnition
of ˆ σ (12) and with (23), we get
r
J









whichwe call the “general equilibrium”rent to distinguish it from the “partial equilibrium”
rent (16). It is easy to see that the equivalent of Proposition 1 holds also for the general
equilibrium rent (26).




In fact, the total derivative of rJ














where both terms of the sum on the right hand side are positive; the ﬁrst term by Propo-
sition 1, the second because, from Proposition 4, ∂b σ/∂τ < 0.
Equation (27) illustrates well the two main forces at work in this model. The ﬁrst is
the positive eﬀect of τ on rents holding constant the composition of the pool of opponents,
i.e., holding constant π; this is the moral hazard eﬀect. The second is the positive eﬀect
of τ on rents due to the response of the composition of the pool of opponents; this is the
interaction between the moral hazard and the opponent selection eﬀects.
6In this simple model, if we assumed that parties maximize expected rents, they would always choose
the high quality type as candidate. The reason is that he would have a higher probability of winning and
second period rents are the same for all types. But this is clearly too simplistic, because of both the two
period restriction and the neglect of intra-party conﬂict. The literature on how parties choose candidates
is still rather scarce - but see Carillo and Mariotti (2001), Galasso and Nannicini (2009), and Persico,
Rodriguez Pueblita, and Silverman (2009).
152.5 The probability of reelection
The model also has predictions on the eﬀect of budget size on the probability of reelection.
Consider expression (18), the probability of reelection based on the information available
to the incumbent. By the law of large numbers, this is also the average probability of
reelection of an incumbent of type J.
Proposition 6 The probability of reelection of an incumbent of type J is an increasing
function of budget size:
dp∗J
dτ > 0.
This follows directly from the eﬀect of a larger budget size on the average competence
of the opponents: as the budget size increases, more low quality individuals are drawn into
the pool of opponents (Proposition 4). Thus, despite grabbing more rents, in equilibrium
the incumbent is more likely to be reappointed. This result reﬂects voters’ rationality.
Voters realize that equilibrium rents have increased with a larger budget, but they only
care about the competence of future mayors. Hence, as the pool of opponents deteriorates
in quality, voters become less demanding and apply a lower quality threshold for reelecting
the incumbent. As a result, the incumbents’ chances of winning go up.
Propositions 4 and 6 highlight an important implication of the analysis: a windfall of
revenues is harmful not only because it tempts public oﬃcials into more corruption, but
also because over time it leads to a deterioration of the quality of elected oﬃcials. This
result is related to those obtained by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991). But whereas
they consider the allocation of talent between productive and rent-seeking activities in the
private sector, here we highlight the implications of windfall revenues for the selection of
talents into public oﬃce.
2.6 Discussion
Although the model is highly stylized in its description of the political process, it gener-
ates several interesting implications. We highlight one such set of results, namely those
relating to the eﬀects of a windfall of government revenues. The remainder of the paper
tests these implications on Brazilian municipal data, exploiting an institutional feature
whereby federal transfers to municipal governments vary exogenously according to given
16population thresholds. The parameter τ in the model therefore corresponds to federal
transfers received by municipal governments.
The theory generates predictions about the size of corruption (political rents, rt) and
the frequency of detection (qrt). In the data, we observe only the frequency of detection
(and possibly the size of corruption conditional on being detected). By the law of large
numbers, the theory predicts that larger federal transfers should be associated with:
i) more frequent episodes of political corruption by the mayor (Propositions 1 and 5);
ii) a lower observed quality of the pool of political opponents in the elections for mayor
(Proposition 4);
iii) more frequent reappointment of the incumbent mayor (Proposition 6).
Given the richness of the data, we can also test two additional implications of the
theory concerning the interactions between these eﬀects, namely:
iv) episodes of political corruption are more frequent when the opponents are of lower
quality (Proposition 2);
v) the positive eﬀect of federal transfers on the frequency of corruption is more pro-
nounced when the opponents are of lower quality (Proposition 3).
However, the empirical tests of these last two implications—unlike those of the ﬁrst
three—must rely on descriptiverather than quasi-experimentalevidence, because the RDD
setup only applies to transfers (τ) as a treatment.
Finally, the model has other implications, that we do not take to the data because they
have already been investigated before. In particular, Ferraz and Finan (2009a) have used
this same dataset to show that term limits induce more frequent corruption in the last
term of oﬃce of the mayor (one of the implications of this model). And several empirical
studies (such as Persson and Tabellini, 2003) have investigated the presence of electoral
business cycles in diﬀerent countries, also an implication of inﬁnite horizon versions of this
model where elections take place in diﬀerent periods.
173 Institutions and Data
This section describes the institutional framework and the data we use in the empirical
analysis. The main variables of interest refer to federal transfers to municipal governments
(the variable τ in the model), corruption (the variables rt and qrt in the model), and the
observed quality of political candidates (their type J). The empirical counterpart of each
of these variables is described in a separate subsection below.
3.1 Federal transfers to municipal governments
3.1.1 Institutional framework
Brazilian municipal governments are managed by an elected mayor (Prefeito) and an
elected city council (Camera dos Vereadores). Mayors are directly elected by voters with
plurality rule. Since 2000, the term limit for mayors has been extended from one to two
terms. The mayoral term lasts four years, and elections are usually held in October (oath
of oﬃce taking place in January of the following year).
Municipal governments are in charge of a relevant share of the provision of public
goods and services related to education, health, and infrastructure projects. Most of
the municipal resources are intergovernmental transfers from either the federal or state
government.7 For municipalities with less than 50,000 inhabitants—those included in
our sample—local taxes represent only 6% of total revenues. The single most important
source of municipal revenues (40%) is the Fundo de Participa¸ c˜ ao dos Municipios (FPM),
consisting of automatic federal transfers established by the Federal Constitution of Brazil
(Art. 159 Ib). FPM transfers amount to 75% of all federal transfers and, according to
the rules that regulate the allocation of these funds, municipal governments must spend
15% of them for education and 15% for health care, while the remainder is unrestricted.8
Our study focuses on this type of transfers, both for their relevance and because the
amount of FPM resources received by each municipality depends on population size in a
discontinuous fashion that is crucial for our identiﬁcation strategy (see next section).
7Brazil is divided into 26 states and 1 federal district (Brasilia).
8There are other current transfers that follow a constitutional rule and are completely tied to education
(FNDE), social assistance (FNAS), and health care (SUS). However, FPM transfers represent 79% of all
current federal transfers, SUS 8%, FNAS 1%, and FNDE 2%.
18According to the FPM allocation mechanism, municipalities are divided into popula-
tion brackets that determine the coeﬃcients used to share total state resources earmarked
for the FPM, with smaller population brackets corresponding to lower coeﬃcients. Since
each state receives a diﬀerent share of the total resources earmarked for FPM, two munic-
ipalities in the same population bracket receive identical transfers only if they are located
in the same state. More precisely, deﬁne FPMk
i as the amount of FPM transfers received






where FPMk is the amount of resources allocated to state k and λi is the FPM coeﬃcient
of municipality i based on its population size.9
Table 1 reports the population brackets and the associated FPM coeﬃcients.10 As
discussed below, because of sample size limitations, we restrict the empirical analysis to
municipalities with population below 50,940 (about 90% of Brazilian municipalities and
34% of the total population) and focus on the initial seven thresholds: 10,189; 13,585;
16,981; 23,773; 30,564; 37,356; and 44,148. The intervals between the initial three thresh-
olds are equal to 3,396, while the intervals between the subsequent thresholds amount to
twice as much (6,792). For the sake of symmetry, we then restrict our sample to munici-
palities from 3,396 below the ﬁrst threshold to 6,792 above the seventh threshold. Within
this population range, there are no other legislative or institutional discontinuities, with
only one exception: at 10,000 inhabitants, the cap in the wage of city councillors increases
by 50% (from 1,927 to 2,891 Brazilian reais, as of 2004).
The coeﬃcient of each municipality is set by the Federal Court Account (Tribunal de
Contas Uni˜ ao, TCU), based on the population estimates calculated yearly by an inde-
pendent statistical agency, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto
Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estat´ ıstica, IBGE). IBGE uses a top-down approach so that the
municipality estimates are consistent with the state estimates, which in turn are consistent
with the estimated population of the whole country, calculated on the basis of birth rates,
9At the federal level, the resources earmarked for FPM transfers are 22.5% of total revenues from the
federal income tax and 22.5% of revenues from industrial products tax. The resources are then allocated
to the diﬀerent states (FPMk), with poorer states generally receiving a larger share.
10See Decree No. 1881/81, August 1981.
19mortality rates, and net immigration between Censuses. In Appendix I, we describe the
exact statistical procedure followed by IBGE to calculate its population estimates.
As further discussed below, population estimates from IBGE in a given year, however,
do not perfectly predict the FPM transfers each municipality receives in the subsequent
year. There may be various reasons for that. During the 1990s, several municipalities split
and this reduced the population size of pre-existing municipalities. As a result, a munici-
pality that had lost part of its population should have had its coeﬃcient reduced according
to the new population. However, several law amendments froze the FPM coeﬃcients and
this practice generated major distortions. In order to avoid these distortions, the federal
government established that by 2008 all municipalities should be framed in FPM coeﬃ-
cients corresponding to their actual population estimate.11 To avoid shocks in the ﬁnance
of the involved municipalities, however, the law established a transition period to the new
regime, so that in the period 2001–08 some municipalities still received FPM transfers
that were not consistent with their population. Furthermore, the FPM allocation proce-
dure is not audited. The population ﬁgures used by TCU and the associated coeﬃcients
are published in the Di´ ario Oﬁcial da Uni˜ ao. For some years, we compared population
estimates from IBGE and those used by TCU, and they do not perfectly coincide.12
3.1.2 Data on transfers
Our data cover two mayoral terms: January 2001–December 2004 and January 2005–
December 2008. We measure two key variables of the FPM revenue-sharing mechanism:
the amount of federal transfers and the IBGE population estimates.
Data on FPM transfers received by each municipality are available from the website of
the Brazilian National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional). The variable we use in the empirical
analysis is the average amount of transfers in the ﬁrst three years of each term (in real
values), therefore excluding the year in which the next election is held.13 This value is a
proxy for the amount of transfers that mayoral candidates in the 2000 and 2004 elections
11See Supplementary Law No. 91/97, as amended by Law No. 106/2001.
12We could retrieve only a few years for the population estimates used by TCU, because they are not
available in electronic format. Note that Litschig (2008b) detects some evidence of manipulative sorting
above the FPM thresholds in the TCU population ﬁgures for the years 1989 and 1991.
13We cannot use 2008 (the electoral year at the end of term 2005–2008) because the IBGE population
estimates for 2007 are not available; we therefore exclude also 2004 (the electoral year at the end of term
2001–2004) for consistency. Estimation results are not sensitive to this choice.
20should expect to receive during the next term, in case they won the electoral race. The
averaging across years within the same term also allows us to minimize measurement error.
Population estimates are directly available from the IBGE website. We use them to
construct the “theoretical transfers” that each municipality in every state should receive,
if other factors did not play any role. In theory, the amount of transfers each municipality
receives should be calculated according to the IBGE population estimates that are sent
to TCU in the previous year. Therefore, for the term 2001–2004, we use an average of the
IBGE population estimates for the years 2000, 2001, and 2002; for the term 2005–2008,
we use estimates for the years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
As explained below, for reasons of data availability, we exploit two samples of munici-
palities: a small and a large sample. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics, by population
intervals, on the actual and theoretical FPM transfers in both samples. On average, mu-
nicipalities in our large sample receive 33.79 hundred thousand Brazilian reais at 2000
prices (standard deviation 12.63). Theoretical transfers are slightly lower, with an average
of 33.44 (standard deviation 13.20).
Figure 1 depicts the actual (top panel) and theoretical (bottom panel) FPM transfers
against the IBGE population estimates in the large sample. The left ﬁgure in the top
panel displays the scatterplot of the received transfers over the period 2001–2007; the
seven vertical lines represent the FPM population thresholds. The right ﬁgure in the top
panel shows the same association in a diﬀerent way: a scatterplot where FPM transfers
are averaged over cells of 100 inhabitants, plus the smoothed average of transfers (solid
line) calculated separately in each interval from one threshold to the next. Both ﬁgures
display visible jumps at the FPM thresholds, with the exception of the seventh, where
sample size is also starting to get smaller.14 Some noise, however, persists around each
threshold, pointing to possible cases of misassignment. This is evident when the above
ﬁgures are compared with those in the bottom panel of Figure 1, which display the the-
oretical transfers. There—by construction—the jumps at the seven thresholds are clean.
Note that also theoretical transfers show some within-bracket variability because of the
diﬀerent shares received by the states, and this variability increases with population size.
14The results of the empirical analysis are not sensitive to the exclusion of the seventh threshold.
21Figure 2 emphasizes an additional peculiarity of the FPM allocation mechanism: since,
within each state k and population bracket λ, municipalities obtain the same resources,
the per-capita amount of both received and theoretical transfers is a decreasing function
of population size within each bracket.
Finally, to check whether the increase in FPM transfers completely crowd-out other
types of revenues, leaving the budget size unchanged, we also collected data on munici-
pal ﬁnance, available from the Brazilian National Treasury website (FIMBRA dataset).
However, these budget data—unlike the data on FPM transfers—are self-reported and
therefore come from a diﬀerent source.
3.2 The Brazilian anti-corruption program
3.2.1 Institutional framework
In 2003, the Brazilianfederal government launched a major anti-corruption program. Since
then, municipalities have been randomly chosen by lottery to be audited on a monthly
basis. Auditors examine the use of federal transfers at the local level. Members of the
government, the media, and the general public may attend the lottery. The Corregedoria
Geral da Uni˜ ao (CGU) is the independent body that conducts the audits. For each
municipality selected by lottery, auditors collect documents and information from the
period 2001 to the present. A few months after the audit, reports are sent to all levels
of governments and are also made available on the CGU website. Each report contains
information on the total amount of federal transfers audited. More importantly, the report
contains a list that describes the full details of the irregularities found by the auditors
and the related sector (health, education, social assistance, or infrastructure). Example of
irregularitiesare: fraud, non-competitive bidding in procurement contracts, over-invoicing,
diversion of funds, lack of completeness, non-utilization of the funds, as well as others.
Between 2003 and 2004, in each lottery, 50 municipalitieswere randomly selected to be
audited. Since 2004, 60 municipalitieshave been selectedin each lottery. To date, the total
number of audited municipalitiesis over 1,500. The program thus provide a valuable source
of information on budget irregularities and corruption episodes in municipal governments.
Most of the audits concern projects or public works ﬁnanced by speciﬁc federal trans-
fers other than the FPM transfers, although some projects ﬁnanced or co-ﬁnanced by
22the municipality unconstrained resources (therefore including FPM transfers) are also au-
dited.15 Thus, in the analysis below, we ask how an exogenous increase in FPM transfers
around the population thresholds aﬀects corruption in the use of all sources of municipal
revenues. Since 70% of FPM transfers are unrestricted and given that FPM transfers
account for the largest fraction of municipal revenues, this question corresponds to a test
of Propositions 1 and 5 in the model (how rents react to a change in overall budget size τ).
Speciﬁcally, the theory predicts that, as FPM transfers increase, municipal governments
feel less restrained in pleasing the voters and engage in more abuses of all kinds, and not
just abuses concerning the FPM transfers.
We now describe in more detail how we classify each occurrence in the audit reports,
in the spirit of Ferraz and Finan (2008).
3.2.2 Data on corruption
Because of sample size limitations in the audited local governments, we restrict the sample
to municipalities with less than 50,940 inhabitants, corresponding to the ﬁrst seven FPM
thresholds (see Table 1). In the two mayoral terms of our analysis, 606 municipalities were
randomly selected through the ﬁrst 17 lotteries of the Brazilian anti-corruption program.16
The bad administration and corruption occurrences reported in the audit reports are thus
related to the municipal administration that was in power during the two terms (551
municipalities in 2001–2004 and 55 municipalities in 2005–2008).
Many types of irregularities are detected by the audits. Illegal procurement practices,
diversion of funds, over-invoicing of goods and services, and fraud are the most common
occurrences. We introduce two deﬁnitions of corruption: broad corruption, which includes
irregularities that could also be interpreted as bad administration rather than as overt
corruption; and narrow corruption, which only includes severe irregularities. For both
deﬁnitions, we construct a binary variable (whether any irregularity was found or not)
and a discrete indicator (the number of detected violation episodes). As a robustness
15In particular, to obtain discretionary transfers (covenio, most of them for infrastructures), municipal-
ities should contribute for a share of the project (contrapartida), whose amount is deﬁned according to
limits based on the municipal ﬁnancial capacity as established by the Lei de Diretrizes Or¸ cament´ arias.
Municipalities with population below 50,000 should ﬁnance from 2% to 4% of the total cost of the project.
16Starting with the 18th lottery, the audit reports changed structure, making the classiﬁcation of vio-
lation episodes more diﬃcult.
23check, we also consider an additional measure for each deﬁnition of corruption, namely
the ratio between the total amount of funds involved in the violation and the total amount
audited. The results for these additional measures are similar to those for the number of
violations reported in Section 5 and are available upon request.
The deﬁnitionof broad corruption includesthe followingcategories of violationepisodes:
1) illegal procurement practices, occurring when any of these episodes are reported: a) com-
petition has been limited, for example, when associates of the mayor’s family or friends
receive non-public information related to the value of the project, b) manipulation of the
bid value, c) an irregular ﬁrm wins the bid process, d) the minimum number of bids is not
attained, or e) the required procurement procedure is not executed; 2) fraud; 3) favoritism
in the good receipt; 4) over-invoicing, occurring when there is evidence that public goods
or services are purchased for a value above the market price; 5) diversion of funds; 6)
paid but not proven, occurring when expenses are not proven. In Appendix II, we report
relevant examples for each violation category.
The deﬁnition of narrow corruption includesthe following irregularities: 1) severeillegal
procurement practices; 2) fraud; 3) favoritism; 4) over-invoicing. In our opinion, many of
the irregularitiesregarding the two categories diversion of funds and paid but not proven do
not necessarily imply corruption (see Appendix II). Also some illegal procurement practices
might result more from bad administration than from outright corruption: therefore,
narrow corruption includes these episodes only if they resulted in severe violations, such
as favoring one speciﬁc ﬁrm or manipulating the bid value.
In the following, we refer to “small sample”—consisting of 606 observations—as the
(random) sample for which we have information on the corruption measures. Descriptive
statistics on these variables—by population intervals—are reported in Table 3. According
to our broad measure of corruption, 71% of mayors in the municipalities in our sample
are found to be corrupt. This ﬁgure is decreasing with population size. For the more
restrictive measure, 42% of the mayors are found to be corrupt. This measure shows
higher variability, but with no clear pattern across intervals. The number of corruption
episodes, on average, is 1.99 and 0.73 for the broad and narrow deﬁnition, respectively.17
17Note that our deﬁnition of broad corruption is close to the measure used by Ferraz and Finan (2009a,
Table 1), whose incidence is 78%.
24Note that, among the 606 observations in the small sample, 229 (about 38%) refer to
mayors who are in their ﬁrst term and then decide to stand for reelection. This corresponds
exactly to the ﬁrst period analyzed in the model. Since the model predicts that the
behavior of the mayor could diﬀer depending on the term of oﬃce, as a robustness check
below we also restrict attention to these mayors.
3.3 Measuring the quality of politicians
In the model of Section 2, the observed quality of political candidates (their type J) is
correlated both with their potential talent in government, and with their opportunity cost
of being in politics. We measure these individual features with reference to education
and to the previous occupation outside of politics. Since the unit of analysis is the mu-
nicipality in a legislative term, we refer to the average features of the pool of candidates
in each municipal election included in our sample. Speciﬁcally: 1) college denotes the
fraction of candidates with at least a college degree; 2) years of schooling denotes the
candidates’ average years of schooling; and 3) high-skilled occupation denotes the fraction
of candidates previously employed in occupations associated with a high opportunity cost
of entering politics.18 The source for these variables is the dataset on elected oﬃcials from
the Brazilian Electoral Court (Supremo Tribunal Eleitoral) website. We collected data for
all municipalities in the relevant population brackets, for the elections held in 2004 and
2008, irrespective of whether or not they were audited. Therefore, this corresponds to
a much larger sample of municipal governments than the small sample for which we can
measure corruption.
The relevant variable in the model (π) refers to the quality (or type) composition of the
pool of opponents in the ﬁrst-term reelection of the incumbent mayor. We thus restrict
attention to municipalities and mayoral terms in which the mayor is actually running for
reelection, within the relevant population brackets . We refer to this set of observations
as the “large sample” (2,788 observations). Here, in accordance with the model, the set of
candidates for which we measure education and previous occupation corresponds to the
18We have classiﬁed as high-skilled these seven occupation categories: lawyers (7% of the sample),
physicians (8%), managers (3%), entrepreneurs (11%), agricultural entrepreneurs (15%), and other pro-
fessionals (12%). The remaining occupation categories include: blue collars (2%), general employees, such
as oﬃce assistants, waiters, secretaries, etc. (2%), self-employed (15%), politicians (5%), public employees
(10%), retired (3%), and other (7%).
25pool of opponents faced by the incumbent mayor. Thus, the variable college measures the
fraction of opponents with a college degree, and so on.
For this large sample, Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the opponents’ charac-
teristics and the reelection frequency of incumbent mayors, by population intervals. On
average, the political opponents in our sample have about 11.9 years of schooling, and
44% of them went to college. As one would expect, educational attainments increase with
population size. Local politicians are relatively highly educated, as only 8% of the Brazil-
ian population aged between 25 and 64 have a college degree.19. As for occupation, 57% of
politicians had a high-skilled job before entering politics. Finally, 59% of the incumbent
mayors running for another term win their bid for reelection.20
Clearly, this sample is not random, since it only refers to the elections in which the
incumbent mayor has chosen to run for reappointment. As a robustness check, below
we also report results for the larger sample referring to all municipalities of the relevant
population size on which data are available, and that includes also the observations where
the mayor does not run for reelection(either because he is in the second term, or because he
chooses not to run). There, the set of candidates for which the average quality is reported
corresponds either to all political candidates (since we cannot distinguish between an
incumbent and a set of opponents), or to all political candidates but the candidate of the
political party of the incumbent mayor.
4 Econometric Strategy
In this section, we formalize the econometric strategy that allows us to identify the eﬀect
of federal transfers on both corruption and the patterns of political selection in Brazilian
municipalities. Basically, the institutional setup described in the previous section delivers
a treatment assignment mechanism typical of a (fuzzy) Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD). Treatment assignment—receiving high versus low federal transfers—depends on
the running variable—population size—in a stochastic manner, but in such a way that the
propensity score—the probability of being treated conditional on the running variable—is
19Source: Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra por Domic´ ılios, PNAD, 2004.
20Although we do not consider gender and age as outcome variables, note that the politicians in our
sample are predominantly male (89%) and, on average, 50.4 years old.
26known to have relevant discontinuities at multiple thresholds. The fuzzy design arises
from the fact that, as discussed in the previous section and shown in the top panel of
Figure 1, there are cases of misassignment around the cutoﬀs, with municipalities near
each threshold appearing both in the treatment and control group. In other words, not
all municipalities receive the amount of (theoretical) transfers they should receive based
on their IBGE population estimate (Pi) and the state they belong to.
At each threshold Pj, separating population brackets j and j +1 in the FPM revenue-
sharing mechanism, “theoretical” transfers (ˆ τ) sharply increase from a lower (`j) to a
higher level (hj): ˆ τi = `j if Pj−1 < Pi < Pj, and ˆ τi = hj if Pj < Pi < Pj+1, with hj > `j.
Theoretical transfers are thus a step function of Pi. Actual transfers (τ), however, do
not necessarily follow through. One can think of theoretical transfers as the treatment
assignment and actual transfers as the observed treatment, in a situation of imperfect
compliance. Treatment assignment is exogenous around the policy thresholds, although
the observed treatment may also be inﬂuenced by additional factors, such as politicians’
ability in sidestepping the exogenous assignment rule or other random elements. As long
as actual transfers depend on theoretical transfers, however, we can use the latter as an
instrument in a (fuzzy) regression discontinuity setup. To capture that both the outcome
of interest (y) and actual transfers depend on theoretical transfers and other stochastic
elements, we can use a potential outcome notation, where yi(ˆ τ) and τi(ˆ τ) are the poten-
tial values of the outcome variable and actual transfers, both expressed as a function of
theoretical transfers (i.e., treatment assignment).21
Formally, under the assumption of continuity of the conditional regression functions of
potential outcomes at the cutoﬀ Pj (see Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001; Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008), we can identify the reduced-form (or intention-to-treat) eﬀects of
theoretical transfers on both actual transfers and corruption as:
E[τi(hj) − τi(`j)|Pi = Pj] = lim
P↓Pj
E[τi|Pi = P] − lim
P↑Pj
E[τi|Pi = P], (28)
E[yi(hj) − yi(`j)|Pi = Pj] = lim
P↓Pj
E[yi|Pi = P] − lim
P↑Pj
E[yi|Pi = P]. (29)
In our framework, the continuity assumption simply requires that: i) there are no other
21For the sake of simple notation, we omit time subscripts, but in our data observations also vary across
(two) periods. In the empirical analysis, we control for that by including time dummies in all speciﬁcations
and clustering the standard errors at the municipality level.
27policies using a population discontinuity at Pj; ii) municipalities cannot manipulate popu-
lation estimates to sort above Pj and receive more transfers. We already checked the ﬁrst
condition in Section 3.1; we will formally test the second in Section 5.1.
The above reduced-form eﬀects can be consistently estimated in the following way (see
Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Garibaldi et al., 2009):
τi = g(Pi) + ατˆ τi + δt + γp + ui, (30)
yi = g(Pi) + αyˆ τi + δt + γp + ηi, (31)
where g(.) is a high-order polynomial in Pi, δt time ﬁxed eﬀects, γp state ﬁxed eﬀects, and
both error terms ui and ηi are clustered at the municipality level. In a trade-oﬀ between
accuracy and transparency, we estimate these equations both in the overall sample and
around each threshold Pj, as long as sample size allows us to do that.
The next step is to use the above reduced-forms to identify the causal eﬀect of FPM
transfers on the outcome of interest. Under the same continuity conditions, we have that
the quantity
limP↓Pj E[yi|Pi = P] − limP↑Pj E[yi|Pi = P]
limP↓Pj E[τi|Pi = P] − limP↑Pj E[τi|Pi = P]
(32)
identiﬁes the average eﬀect of actual transfers on the outcome y for compliers, that is,
for those municipalities above (below) the cutoﬀ that receive more (less) transfers exactly
because of their higher (lower) theoretical transfers, that is, because of their treatment
assignment based on the IBGE population estimates.
The causal interpretation of this IV estimand rests on two additional assumptions (see
Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996): i) exclusion restriction; ii)
monotonicity. The ﬁrst condition states that theoretical transfers—which are a deter-
ministic (and discontinuous) function of population estimates—aﬀect the outcome only
through the transfers actually received by municipalities; and this is plausible as long as
other policies do not share the same discontinuities. The monotonicity condition states
that, at each threshold, municipalities assigned below the cutoﬀ do not eﬀectively receive
more transfers than if they had been assigned above the cutoﬀ. This assumption—like
the exclusion restriction—is untestable because it involves potential outcomes, but it is
more than plausible in our context. Indirectly, in Figure 1, the visible jumps in observed
28transfers at the FPM thresholds (all of them in the same, positive direction) are reassuring
about the validity of the monotonicity condition.
Finally, it is worth noting that the causal eﬀect we are identifying is local in a twofold
meaning. First, because of the RDD setup, it only refers to observations around the
thresholds. Second, because of the IV setup, it only refers to compliers, that is, munic-
ipalities that received larger transfers because of the (exogenous) FPM revenue-sharing
mechanism. The external validity of our exercise is of course enhanced by the presence of
multiple thresholds. Yet, the identiﬁcation on compliers leaves aside a subpopulation that
might be of interest on its own: the always takers, that is, municipalities receiving larger
transfers irrespective of their position above or below each population threshold.
We can implement (32) by estimating the following equation:
yi = g(Pi) + βrτi + δt + γp + ￿i, (33)
where theoretical transfers ˆ τi are used as an instrument for τi, g(.) is a high-order polyno-
mial in Pi, δt time ﬁxed eﬀects, γp state ﬁxed eﬀects, and the error terms ￿i are clustered at
the municipality level. As above, we estimate (33) both in the overall sample and around
each threshold Pj. This estimation, depending on the outcome, delivers direct tests of
Propositions 1 and 5 (if y measures corruption), Proposition 4 (if y measures opponents’
quality), and Proposition 6 (if y is incumbent’s reelection) in our theoretical model.
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Validity tests and preliminary results
Our identiﬁcation strategy is valid if the population estimate we use as an instrument—
the IBGE population data—is not manipulated by local governments to sort above the
thresholds. Figure 3 shows the frequency of municipalities with less than 50,941 inhab-
itants, using diﬀerent binsizes (283, 566, and 1,132 inhabitants) that never contain our
seven thresholds, identiﬁed by the vertical lines. The population distribution is positively
skewed. More importantly, visual inspection does not reveal any frequency discontinuity
at the FPM thresholds.
We formally test for the presence of a density discontinuity at the seven thresholds in
Figures 4 and 5, where we perform a battery of McCrary tests by running kernel local
29linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of each threshold (see
McCrary, 2008). In Figure 4, we run the tests using our population measure—averaged
over the term of oﬃce—both in the pooled thresholds used in our estimations (1–7 and 1–
3) and separately in each of the seven thresholds. We implement the pooling of thresholds
1–7 and 1–3 by merging the thresholds together and normalizing population size as the
distance from the closest threshold (with symmetric intervals around each threshold so
that no municipality belongs to more than one interval). As a result, each interval runs
from the midpoint below to the midpoint above every threshold (with a length of 3,396
around the ﬁrst three thresholds and of 6,792 around the others). As we can see from
the ﬁgure, the log-diﬀerence between the frequency to the right and to the left of each
threshold is never statistically signiﬁcant.22
In Figure 5, we perform the same test for the pooled threshold 1–7 but separately in
every year, in order to control that our average population over the term is not masking
manipulative sorting in a particular year. Again, the log-diﬀerence between the frequency
to the right and to the left of each threshold is never statistically signiﬁcant, despite some
(visual) evidence of a little sorting in the population estimates for 2001.23
In Table 5, we further check for manipulative sorting by performing balance tests on the
available invariant town characteristics. If there were nonrandom sorting, we should expect
some of these characteristics to diﬀer systematically between treated and untreated mu-
nicipalities around each threshold. The invariant characteristics we look at are the size of
the municipal area (measured in km2) and the geographical location according to Brazil-
ian macro-regions (North, Northeast, Center, South, Southeast), because all the other
variables in our dataset are endogenous to the policy. The balance tests are performed
by estimating discontinuities in the invariant characteristics at every pooled or individual
threshold as the jump in a (split) third-order polynomial ﬁtted separately on either side
of each threshold. No pre-treatment characteristics show a signiﬁcant discontinuity.
22Point estimates (standard errors) for the tests in Figure 4 are as follows. Thresholds 1–7: -0.080
(0.198); thresholds 1–3: -0.168 (0.205); threshold 1: -0.229 (0.352); threshold 2: 0.319 (0.325); threshold
3: -0.690 (0.397); threshold 4: 0.304 (0.351); threshold 5: 0.719 (0.691); threshold 6: -0.518 (0.761);
threshold 7: -0.405 (1.240). Optimal bandwidth and binsize as in McCrary (2008).
23Point estimates (standard errors) for the tests in Figure 5 are as follows. Year 2000: 0.040 (0.159);
year 2001: 0.258 (0.175); year 2002: 0.169 (0.171); year 2004: -0.157 (0.154); year 2005: 0.130 (0.166);
year 2006: -0.221 (0.187). Optimal bandwidth and binsize as in McCrary (2008).
30As the current FPM thresholds were established in 1981, we can also use information
from the 1980 Brazilian Census to check whether some proxies for the (pre-treatment)
development level of the municipalities are balanced around the (future) thresholds. For
this purpose, we use data from La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea (2008) on the average
employment, the average ownership of durables (such as car, radio, and refrigerator),
and the average house access to public infrastructures (such as water and sewer) at the
municipal level. These additional balance tests, however, can be performed only on a
(selected) subsample of municipalities in our dataset, that is, those that already existed in
1980. From the original 2,788 municipalitiesin our large sample, we thus end up with 2,217
observations. Table 6 reports the estimation results. No (pre-treatment) employment or
wealth variables show a signiﬁcant discontinuity.
All of the above suggests that the running variable of our fuzzy RDD does not show
any evidence of manipulation, so that we can safely use it as a (local) source of exogenous
variation in the neighborhoods of our seven FPM thresholds. This is indeed what we
should expect, given how IBGE population estimates are constructed by combining past
Census information and imputing a certain rate of population growth to each municipality
according to the cell it belongs to (see Appendix I for more details). If manipulative sorting
were at work in the actual Census population numbers—for example, if mayors were able to
attract more inhabitants to obtain larger transfers—we would expect the IBGE estimates
to remove this problem by means of the estimation procedure. If manipulative sorting were
instead at work in the oﬃcial ﬁgures released to obtain the transfers, we would expect this
to happen in the TCU data, and the use of IBGE estimates as an instrument would thus
serve the purpose of removing this problem.
Finally, to verify that indeed our seven FPM thresholds correspond to relevant changes
in municipal ﬁscal policy, we regress some observed budgetary items against our measure
of theoretical transfers. This is relevant, because FPM transfers do not correspond to
the totality of federal or state transfers to municipal governments. Hence, to test the
predictions of the model, we need to assume that the increase in FPM transfers that
occurs at the population thresholds is not entirely oﬀset by a corresponding reduction
in other (discretionary) federal or state transfers. The results are displayed in Table 7,
where we implement equation (30) with the (log of) the budget indicators as dependent
31variables, and the (log of) theoretical transfers as the regressor of interest. All variables
are reactive to the policy thresholds. In particular, the elasticity of total revenues is
positive and signiﬁcant, although slightly lower than it would be expected if other sources
of revenues remained invariant, keeping into account the FPM share (about 40%). This
suggests that local governments react to the additional transfers by reducing local taxes,
as indeed shown in column 2 of Table 7. Local expenditures also go up with larger federal
transfers (see the remaining columns of the table), indicating that the reduction in local
taxes does not entirely oﬀset the extra federal revenues. Note that the sources of data on
the budgetary items displayed in Table 7 are not the same as for the FPM transfers, so
that these coeﬃcients ought to be treated with caution.
5.2 Estimation results and robustness checks
In this section, we implement the (fuzzy) RDD estimations discussed in Section 4 and test
the predictions of our model.
5.2.1 Transfers and corruption
We start by investigating the eﬀect of federal transfers on corruption (Propositions 1 and
5 above). The results, consistently with the theory, point to a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of ﬁscal windfalls on the frequency of corruption episodes.
Table 8 estimates the ﬁrst stage and the reduced-form regressions—equations (30)-(31).
Throughout, we control for a third-order polynomial in population size, as well as time
and state dummies. The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients of theoretical transfers,
in a regression where the dependent variable corresponds to each column heading. The
row “Thresholds 1–7” is obtained by estimating a single regression on the entire sample,
and implicitly constraining the coeﬃcient on theoretical transfers to be the same at all
thresholds. Accordingly, the row “Thresholds 1–3” does the same over the ﬁrst three
thresholds. The remaining rows correspond to diﬀerent subsamples, where observations
are partitioned in symmetric intervals around each of the ﬁrst three thresholds.
The ﬁrst column reports the estimated ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcient, namely the eﬀect of theo-
retical transfers on actual FPM transfers. The coeﬃcient is positive and highly signiﬁcant,
but smaller than one. The ﬁnding that the impact of theoretical on actual transfers is less
32than one-for-one is not surprising: it might reﬂect manipulative sorting by the govern-
ment body responsible for assigning an FPM coeﬃcient to each municipality (i.e., some
municipalities just below the threshold might be deliberately misclassiﬁed by TCU as
being above the threshold); measurement error in our constructed variable—theoretical
transfers—might also lead to a downward bias.
The remaining columns in Table 8 report the reduced-form estimates for the diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of corruption. By the estimated coeﬃcientsin the second and third columns, an
increase in theoretical transfers equal to one standard deviation (11.364 hundred thousand
reais in this small sample on corruption) translates into a 34% overall increase in the
incidence of our broad deﬁnition of corruption and a 49% increase in the incidence of the
narrow measure. The impact on the number of violation episodes is signiﬁcant for narrow
corruption, but not for broad corruption.24
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of the discontinuities in the corruption
variables induced by the FPM policy (the intention-to-treat eﬀects). We pool the seven
thresholds together by normalizing population size according to the distance of each mu-
nicipality from the above or below threshold; as above, intervals around each threshold
are symmetric and constructed in such a way that no municipality appears in more than
one interval. As expected, the scatterplots and the ﬁtted third-order polynomials show
relevant discontinuities at zero, especially for the two corruption dummies.
Table 9 estimates the baseline IV regressions—equation (33)—where theoretical trans-
fers are used as instruments for the actual transfers. Consistently with the size of the
ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients, the IV point estimates in Table 9 are almost twice as large as
the intention-to-treat eﬀects. An increase in the amount of actual transfers equal to one
standard deviation (11.275 hundred thousand reais in this small sample) translates into a
60% increase in broad corruption, 86% in narrow corruption, and 93% in the number of
episodes of narrow corruption. Note that also a lower—but more plausible—increase in
FPM transfers by 10% has a relevant impact, increasing broad corruption by 12 percent-
age points (i.e., by about 17%), narrow corruption by 10.1 percentage points (24%), and
24Note that using a treatment dummy rather than theoretical transfers, exactly as we have done for the
balance tests in Tables 5 and 6, yields similar results with respect to the RDD estimations. In particular,
for the pooled thresholds 1–7, we obtain the following estimates (standard errors). Broad corruption:
0.304 (0.068). Narrow corruption: 0.320 (0.076). Episodes of broad corruption: 0.382 (0.249). Episodes
of narrow corruption: 0.442 (0.151). Results for the other thresholds are available upon request.
33the number of episodes of narrow corruption by 0.19 (26%). Looking separately at the
individual thresholds, we can see that moving from the average amount of transfers due
to municipalities below the second threshold to the amount for those above it (an increase
of approximately 6.1 hundred thousand reais) would increase broad corruption by about
51% and narrow corruption by about 52%. For the third threshold, the jumps would be
of about 40% for broad corruption and 89% for narrow corruption.
In Table 10, we implement a series of robustness checks to evaluate the sensitivity of
our results with respect to the functional form of the control function in population size,
G(Pi), included in equation (33), or to the presence of a confounding policy on the wage
of city councillors at 10,000 (see Section 3.1). As for the functional form, we specify G(Pi)
as either a spline third-order polynomial (with each interval going from a midpoint to the
next), a second-order polynomial (spline or not), or a fourth-order polynomial (spline or
not): in all of these cases, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 9 for the
baseline speciﬁcation with a third-order polynomial.
As for the wage policy at 10,000, we introduce two checks: we ﬂexibly control for
a (spline) third-order polynomial that also includes the 10,000 threshold, or we simply
drop municipalities below 10,000 to focus on a sample without confounding policies. Both
robustness checks conﬁrm the baseline results.
Finally, to further assess the validity of our identiﬁcation strategy, in Table 11 we
perform placebo tests by estimating the treatment eﬀect at fake thresholds, where there
should be no eﬀect. In particular, mirroring the balance tests in Tables 5 and 6, we esti-
mate whether there is any discontinuity in our corruption measures at the fake thresholds
represented by the midpoints between the true FPM thresholds. With only one exception
at the 10% level, the eﬀects are never statistically diﬀerent from zero.
On the whole, the quasi-experimental evidence conﬁrms the theoretical prediction of
a political resource curse in terms of increased corruption. As mentioned above, the
corruption episodes documented in the audits are not strictly related to the FPM transfers.
Hence, these estimates document a general deterioration in the quality of the policy-
making environment induced by the additional revenues triggered by the thresholds.
Note that, to gain observations, the speciﬁcations in Tables 8-10 never include regres-
sors referring to the quality of the opponents. Hence, strictly speaking, these estimates
34correspond to a test of Proposition 5, what in Section 2 we called the “general equilib-
rium” eﬀect of budget size on rents, namely the sum of the moral hazard eﬀect (holding
constant the quality of the opponents) and the interaction eﬀect (when the quality of the
opponent is allowed to change with budget size)—see equation (27). The estimates remain
almost unchanged if we also control for the quality of the opponents, suggesting that the
moral hazard eﬀect is responsible for most if not all of the estimated eﬀect of budget size
on corruption. Nevertheless, this might reﬂect data limitations. When we merge the two
samples (with the audited municipalities and with the municipalities where we have data
on the features of the opponents), we are left with only 229 observations. Moreover, in
this small sample, the characteristics of opponents are balanced around the thresholds,
suggesting that there might not be enough variation to disentangle the moral hazard ef-
fect from the interaction eﬀect. The overall impact of transfers on corruption, however,
remains statistically signiﬁcant also in this small sample with 229 observations.
As a ﬁnal remark, recall that FPM transfers are only a fraction of the overall federal and
state transfers received by municipal governments. Under our assumptions we consistently
estimate the eﬀect of FPM transfers on corruption. But to also estimate the eﬀect of a
windfall of revenues on corruption (as by Propositions 1 and 5) we need an additional
hypothesis: namely, that other (discretionary) federal or state transfers remain unchanged
at each population threshold. In particular, if federal or state policymakers oﬀset the
changes in FPM transfers by cutting other sources of municipal revenues at the relevant
population thresholds, then we estimate a lower bound on the eﬀect of τ on corruption.
However, the assumption of no crowding-out seems to be met in our data, as discussed for
Table 7 above.
5.2.2 Transfers and political selection
Next, we study the eﬀect of federal transfers on the quality of political opponents (Propo-
sition 4) and on the incumbent’s reelection (Proposition 6). As explained in Section 3.3, to
stay close to our model’s predictions, we ﬁrst restrict the sample to municipalities where
the ﬁrst-term mayor decides to run for reelection, because only there we have a clear mea-
sure of the quality of the pool of opponents. This sample is larger than that on corruption,
because it also includes municipalities that were not audited.
35Table 12 refers to the ﬁrst-stage and reduced-form regressions, while Table 13 reports
the IV estimates. According to both tables, larger (actual or theoretical) federal transfers
lead to a deterioration in the observed average quality of the opponents and to an increase
in the probability that the incumbent is reelected. According to the IV estimates in
Table 13, an increase in FPM transfers equal to one standard deviation (12.631 hundred
thousand reais in this large sample on political selection) translates into a 26% reduction
in the fraction of opponents with a college degree, a 8% reduction in their average years of
schooling, and a 26% increase in the incumbent’s probability of reelection. Analogously, a
10% increase in actual transfers induces a 7% drop in college, 2% in years of schooling, and
7% increase in the reelectionprobability.25 The overall impact on high-skilledoccupation is
not statistically signiﬁcant, but there is evidence of a negative eﬀect at some thresholds.26
The overall results on education are mostly driven by the ﬁrst threshold, although in
the other thresholds the estimated coeﬃcients have the expected sign, contributing to the
signiﬁcance of the overall eﬀect, where accuracy is improved. As mentioned above, at a
population of 10,000 the legislative cap on the salary of city councillors sharply increases.
One might be concerned that this institutional variation close to the ﬁrst FPM threshold
might be responsible for our ﬁnding. The wage policy, however, involves councillors and
not mayors, whose quality we measure here. And general equilibrium eﬀects from the
selection of councillors to the selection of mayors are implausible, because the wage policy
was only introduced in 2000. Furthermore, Ferraz and Finan (2009b) show that around
10,000 there is a discontinuity in the characteristics of councillors, which may be due
to either the wage cap or the FPM policy studied here. This discontinuity, however, is
equivalent to an increase in the fraction of high (rather than low) quality politicians in
the city council, the opposite of what we ﬁnd for mayors. Nevertheless, below we report
25As the current FPM revenue-sharing mechanism has been in place since 1981, one could be afraid of a
general-equilibrium eﬀect of transfers on politicians’ education through the channel of citizens’ education.
Note that, the eﬀect of transfers on schooling levels being positive (Litschig, 2008a), this would result in
our estimates to be a lower bound of the direct eﬀect of transfers on politicians’ education. Furthermore,
our estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of the municipal literacy rate as an additional control in
all speciﬁcations (results available upon request).
26As for corruption, using a treatment dummy rather than theoretical transfers, exactly as we have
done for the balance tests in Tables 5 and 6, yields similar results with respect to the RDD estimations.
In particular, for the pooled thresholds 1–7, we obtain the following estimates (standard errors). Years
of schooling: -0.069 (0.032). College: -0.490 (0.228). High-skilled occupation: -0.030 (0.023). Reelection:
0.057 (0.039). Results for the other thresholds are available upon request.
36additional robustness exercises that address this issue.
Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of the discontinuities in the political vari-
ables induced by the FPM policy (the intention-to-treat eﬀects). Again, we pool the seven
thresholds together to gain sample size. The two education variables show a clear ten-
dency to grow both before and after the normalized threshold, but the discontinuity at
zero is both clearly visible in the scatterplots and statistically signiﬁcant as the jump in
the (split) third-order polynomials.
In Table 14, we implementa series of robustness checksto evaluate the sensitivity of our
results with respect to the functional form of G(Pi), or to the presence of the confounding
policy on the wage of city councillors at 10,000, as we did for the corruption results in
Table 10. The results are strongly robust to any speciﬁcation of the functional form of
the control function in population size. As for the wage policy at 10,000, the results are
robust to the inclusion of this additional threshold in a (spline) third-order polynomial,
but we lose the signiﬁcance of most estimates when we drop municipalities below 10,000.
In Table 15, we include some additional robustness checks speciﬁc to the political
selection results. There, we replicate our baseline IV estimations in diﬀerent samples.
First, in panel A, we measure only the features of the opponent with the highest number
of votes (in this case, restricting again to municipalities where the incumbent reruns).
Second, in panels B and C, we check whether our results are driven by the (non-random)
sample restriction to municipalities where the incumbents decide to stand for reelection.
In particular, when the incumbent does not rerun, we look at the average quality of all new
candidates (panel B) or at the average quality of the new candidates who do not belong to
the incumbent’spolitical party (panel C). All of these robustness checksare consistent with
the baseline estimates, and the larger sample size even increases the statistical signiﬁcance
of the results at some thresholds.
In Table 16, exactly as we have done for corruption, we implement placebo tests at fake
thresholds (i.e., the midpoints between the true FPM thresholds) for the political selection
variables. The estimated eﬀects are never statistically diﬀerent from zero, supporting once
again the validity of the identiﬁcation strategy.
Finally, note that our results on political selection seem to be mostly driven by the
ﬁrst three thresholds. Although this could simply be due to sample noise, it is tempting
37to speculate that the political arena changes along with local characteristics. In partic-
ular, the average presence of a local radio—which Ferraz and Finan (2009a) show to be
associated with greater political accountability—is 0.13 around the ﬁrst three thresholds
versus 0.31 around the others. Therefore, the eﬀects we ﬁnd could partly interact with
the degree of political accountability.27
5.2.3 Corruption and the quality of opponents
Besides the predictions tested above, our theoretical model has implications on the inter-
play between corruption and political selection: a political opposition of worse quality is
predicted to increase corruption (Proposition 2), and to strengthen the positive impact
of transfers on corruption (Proposition 3). Unfortunately, Brazilian institutions do not
deliver a clean source of exogenous variation to test these propositions, but we can still
control whether they are consistent with existing correlations in our sample. However, an
additional diﬃculty arises from the fact that, as already noted, when we merge the small
(corruption) sample and the large (political selection) sample, the remaining sample size
is quite small (229 observations).
With these limitations in mind, Tables 17 and 18 investigate the correlations. In
both tables, corruption is the dependent variable (measured in diﬀerent ways). Table
17 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of diﬀerent indicators of the quality of the political
opposition, estimated by Probit (marginal eﬀects) or by OLS. No clear correlation between
corruption of the incumbent mayor and the quality of the pool of opponents arises from
this exercise, contradicting Proposition 2. Table 18 is instead motivated by Proposition 3.
There, we report the eﬀects of both FPM transfers and their interactions with diﬀerent
measures of the opponents’ quality. Actual and interacted transfers are instrumented
with theoretical transfers and their respective interaction with opponents’ quality. The
coeﬃcient of interest is the interaction eﬀect, which the theory predicts to be negative.
Although in the larger sample that includes all thresholds there is no clear pattern, when
the sample is restricted to the ﬁrst three thresholds of more comparable municipalities,
27Including the presence of a radio station as a control variable in all the RDD estimations for the
corruption and political selection variables does not aﬀect the results (available upon request), as this
variable is balanced around each threshold. Note that the political party aﬃliation of the mayor is also
balanced around each threshold, therefore excluding additional partisan eﬀect.
38the estimated interaction coeﬃcients always have the (predicted) negative sign, and are
generally statistically signiﬁcant. Thus here the evidence is not inconsistent with the
prediction that the adverse eﬀect of ﬁscal windfalls is more pronounced if the political
opposition is weak.
6 Conclusion
Could a windfall of resources deteriorate the functioning of government institutions? And
if so, how does this happen? These are important questions, because lagging regions or
countries often receive additional funds from higher levels of government or from interna-
tional organizations, to make up for their under-development. Since a common cause of
economic backwardness is precisely the poor functioning of government institutions, the
risk that these additional resources could be counterproductive cannot be neglected.
Here we have focused on two mechanisms that are of fundamental importance in a
variety of situations: the eﬀects of additional resources on political corruption and on
the incentives to participate in politics. At the margin, higher exogenous revenues induce
more corruption, because incumbents have more rooms to grab rents without disappointing
voters. Moreover, if the beneﬁt of corrupt activities is more valuable to those with worse
outside options, individuals of lower quality are attracted into politics. The interaction
between these two eﬀects gives rise to a complementarity: precisely because his opponents
are now of lower quality, an incumbent can aﬀord to grab even more rents while at the
same time increasing his probability of reelection.
In light of these (theoretical) results, we have investigated a speciﬁc Brazilian insti-
tution that provides an ideal quasi-experimental setting. We found considerable support
for the implications of the theory. In particular, a 10% increase in the federal transfers to
municipal governments raises local corruption by 17% (broad deﬁnition, possibly including
bad administration) or by 24% (narrow deﬁnition, with only severe violation episodes).
Moreover, this ﬁscal windfall increases the incumbent’s mayor probability of reelection by
7%, and shrinks the fraction of his opponents with a college degree by 7%.
These results are not inconsistent with higher transfers to municipalities increasing
the quantity and quality of public services provided to the local population. For instance,
Litschig (2008a), in the same quasi-experimental setting we use, ﬁnds that an exogenous
39increase in funds to Brazilian local governments raises spending on public education and
improves literacy rates. Nevertheless, our evidence suggests that these speciﬁc beneﬁts are
accompanied by a general deterioration in the functioning of local government institutions.
How general are these results, and in particular could they extend to other countries
and situations? Only additional research can answer this question. Certainly the high
frequency of abuses detected by the audits suggests that Brazilian municipalities are a
fragile institutional environment where political agency problems are widespread. It could
be that a windfall of resources would not have the same deleterious eﬀects in societies
with a long tradition of good government and with abundant social capital. Nevertheless,
additional resources are often given precisely to regions or countries with weak institutions,
like in the case of Structural Funds to lagging regions in the European Union, or of foreign
aid to developing countries. As a result of these policies, these already weak institutions
could become even weaker.
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43Appendix I: IBGE Population Estimates
IBGE uses a top-down approach to consistently estimate population ﬁgures for the lower
units partitioning the Brazilian territory. According to this methodology, IBGE ﬁrst
produces a population estimate for a larger area in the year t, called Pt. Then, this large
area is split in N smaller areas Pnt, where Pt =
PN
n=1 Pnt, with n = 1,2,...,N. For
instance, assume that Pt is the population estimate for the entire Brazil, based on the
estimated birth rates, mortality rates, and net migration. Pnt is instead the population
estimate for a given state, and it is calculated in the following way:
Pnt = anPt + bn
where an = (Pnt1−Pnt0)/(Pt1−Pt0); bn = Pnt0−anPnt0; t refers to the year of the estimate;
t0 refers to the 1991 Census; and t1 refers to the 2000 Census.
Population estimates at the municipal level follow the same logic. Municipalitieswithin
a given state are grouped by quartiles of both last Census population size and past pop-
ulation growth between Censuses; moreover, growing municipalities between the last two
Censuses are separated from shrinking municipalities. Each of these q = 1,2,...,Q cells
of municipalities is then assigned its share of the state population estimate, Pqnt, propor-
tional to the last cell-speciﬁc Census population. Finally, each municipality within every
cell is assigned its population estimate, Pmqnt, based on past Census information. The
speciﬁc formula for the municipal population estimates is therefore as follows:
Pmqnt = amqnPqnt + bmqn
where amqn = Pmqnt1 − Pmqnt0/Pqnt1 − Pqnt0; bmqn = Pmqnt0 − amqnPmqnt0; t refers to the
year of the estimate; t0 refers to the 1991 Census; and t1 refers to the 2000 Census.
44Appendix II: Examples of Violation Episodes
(1) Illegal procurement practices
(a) Limited competition. In the municipality of Buritis (state of Rondˆ onia), in a
bidding process regarding the purchase of food, the city invited three companies, two of
them from the municipality of Porto Velho, 210 kilometers far from Buritis. Auditors
contested this fact because in Buritis there are companies that could have participated
in the auction. More importantly, the company that won the bid for all 64 items (42,000
reais) was owned by the mayor’s wife. The mayor’s wife was also the accountant of another
company that was invited to participate in the auction.
(b) Manipulation of the bid value. In the municipality of Itapira (state of S˜ ao Paulo),
auditors found evidence of manipulation of the bid value for the acquisition of materials in
the construction of the water supply system. According to Law No. 8666/93, if the value
of the project is below a certain threshold, no bid process is required. Auditors found
evidence that the municipal administration had divided the project into three (fake) sub-
projects in order to avoid the bid procedure.
(2) Fraud
In the municipality of Santa Terezinha (state of Bahia), auditors found evidence of a
simulated auction for the purchase of computer equipment worth about 10,000 reais. The
companies alleged to have participated in the procurement practice were: LL Equipmentos
Inform´ atica Ltda. (winner), MSGL Inform´ atica Ltda., N´ ucleo Com´ ercio, and Servicos de
Inform´ ati¸ ca Ltda. Although it is required that all bidders attend the opening of the tender
envelopes, the company MSGL Inform´ atica Ltda. never participated to the auction. The
director of the winning company (LL Equipmentos) declared to the auditors that: “(...)
I sold computer equipment worth 10,000 reais to the municipality of Santa Teresinha,
represented by the mayor’s husband, who showed me two diﬀerent proposals by other
companies and asked me to under-bid them.”
In the municipality of Salinas da Margarida (state of Bahia), there was evidence of
a simulated auction involving funds for education (FUNDEF): in three bidding processes
for a total amount of 142,600 reais, the alleged participants denied any involvement in the
auction. For example, the owners of the companies Plantek and J.S. Constru¸ c˜ oes Gerais
45formally declared to the auditors that they had not been invited to this auction and that
their signatures had been falsiﬁed.
(3) Favoritism in the good receipt
In the municipality of General Sampaio (state of Cear´ a), auditors found out that the
land on which a dam was built had been previously donated by the city to the owner, and
that this person also owned the surrounding areas, hampering free access to the dam.
(4) Over-invoicing
In the municipality of S˜ ao Fransciso do Conde (state of Bahia), the construction
company Mazda was hired without a bidding process to carry out the construction of a
road nine kilometers long. The road should have been budgeted at about 1 million reais,
but the invoices presented by the company proved that there had been a disbursement of
5 million reais. The municipal administration did not present any document justifying the
expenditure. Mazda, a company with no experience in road construction, sub-contracted
another company to perform the job only paying 1,800,000 reais.
(5) Diversion of funds
The municipality of Buritis (state of Rondˆ onia) received 50,000 reais from the federal
government to purchase a school bus for transporting students. Auditors found that the
vehicle was also used to transport professors from the urban area to schools in rural areas.
Furthermore, the school bus performed trips outside the municipality without justiﬁcation.
In the municipality of Cˆ andido Mendes (state of Maranh˜ ao), 91% of the resources
that should have been spent for the salaries of professors were actually used to pay public
employees performing diﬀerent duties.
In the municipality of Bel´ em (state of Para´ ıba), auditors found out that 160,000 reais
that should have been spent on basic health services (i.e., medical consultations, basic
dental care, vaccinations, educational activities, etc.) were used to pay meals for the staﬀ
of the health program and to cover debt services of the municipality.
(6) Paid but not proven
The municipality of Cerro Branco (state of Rio Grande do Sul) did not provide any
documentation to justify the expenditure of 29,100 reais for health services.
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Notes. FPM coeﬃcient is the coeﬃcient used in the FPM
revenue-sharing mechanism described in Section 3.1. The un-
derlinedthresholdsare those studiedin our empiricalexercise.
Table 2 – Actual and Theoretical FPM Transfers
Small sample Large sample
Population Actual Theoretical Obs. Actual Theoretical Obs.
transfers transfers transfers transfers
6,793–10,188 19.35 17.32 123 20.00 18.93 683
10,189–13,584 24.38 22.45 128 26.22 25.36 516
13,585–16,980 29.77 28.55 99 32.71 32.41 415
16,981–23,772 36.07 35.07 114 38.86 38.83 519
23,773–30,563 41.89 40.49 66 45.48 45.92 302
30,564–37,355 47.27 46.26 42 51.47 52.08 188
37,356–44,147 51.92 50.47 21 58.42 58.48 108
44,148–50,940 61.48 62.05 13 62.50 63.82 57
Total 31.68 30.22 606 33.79 33.44 2,788
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants. The other columns report the average values of actual and
theoreticalFPM transfers (expressedin hundredthousandBrazilianreais at 2000 prices). Small sample refers to observations
for which corruption measures are available (random audit reports). Large sample refers to observations for which political
selection variables are available (i.e., where the incumbent runs for reelection). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
47Table 3 – Corruption Measures
Population Broad Narrow No. of broad No. of narrow Obs.
corruption corruption corruption corruption
episodes episodes
6,793–10,188 0.72 0.35 1.75 0.56 123
10,189–13,584 0.73 0.50 2.05 0.84 128
13,585–16,980 0.72 0.39 2.27 0.64 99
16,981–23,772 0.78 0.53 2.13 0.92 114
23,773–30,563 0.67 0.41 1.94 0.82 66
30,564–37,355 0.62 0.31 1.83 0.67 42
37,356–44,147 0.62 0.24 1.57 0.33 21
44,148–50,940 0.62 0.46 1.85 0.69 13
Total 0.71 0.42 1.99 0.73 606
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants. The other columns report the average values of the corruption
measures. The ﬁrst and second measures are dummies; the third and fourth measures are the number of violation episodes.
See Section 3.2 for the deﬁnition of broad versus narrow corruption. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
Table 4 – Opponents’ Characteristics and Election Outcome
Population College Years of High-skilled Incumbent Obs.
schooling occupation reelection
6,793–10,188 0.39 11.43 0.53 0.58 683
10,189–13,584 0.39 11.56 0.56 0.59 516
13,585–16,980 0.43 11.89 0.60 0.58 415
16,981–23,772 0.49 12.11 0.58 0.62 519
23,773–30,564 0.49 12.50 0.59 0.58 302
30,564–37,356 0.52 12.63 0.58 0.59 188
37,356–44,148 0.52 12.66 0.63 0.69 108
44,148–50,940 0.67 13.42 0.60 0.65 57
Total 0.44 11.93 0.57 0.59 2,788
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants. The other columns report the average values of the characteristics
of the pool of opponents or the reelection of the incumbent. All variables are dummies, except Years of schooling. See
Section 3.3 for the deﬁnition of high-skilled occupation. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
48Table 5 – Balance Tests of Invariant Town Characteristics
Area North Northeast Center South Southeast Obs.
Thresholds 1–7 3.981 0.020 -0.059 -0.014 0.055 -0.003 2,788
(8.212) (0.033) (0.061) (0.032) (0.045) (0.057)
Thresholds 1–3 -4.411 0.035 -0.080 -0.028 0.039 0.034 2,133
(3.610) (0.034) (0.068) (0.037) (0.050) (0.062)
Threshold 1 -2.537 -0.005 -0.131 -0.011 0.130 0.017 1,199
(3.817) (0.049) (0.121) (0.064) (0.099) (0.117)
Threshold 2 2.701 -0.007 -0.012 -0.038 -0.055 0.112 931
(6.885) (0.073) (0.127) (0.079) (0.096) (0.118)
Threshold 3 -1.342 0.088 -0.178 0.018 0.070 0.001 934
(9.039) (0.063) (0.117) (0.064) (0.073) (0.091)
Notes. Discontinuity of invariant town characteristics (area size in km2 and geographic location) at the FPM thresholds,
estimated as the jump of a (split) third-order polynomial around pooled thresholds (i.e., with population normalized as the
distance from the above or below threshold; symmetric intervals with no municipality in more than one interval) or around
individual thresholds. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Table 6 – Balance Tests of Pre-Treatment Town Characteristics
Employed Refrigerator Radio Car Water and Obs.
sewer
Thresholds 1–7 -0.170 0.559 0.460 0.031 -0.118 2,217
(0.700) (0.717) (0.594) (0.307) (0.685)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.714 0.969 0.835 0.079 0.423 1,644
(0.794) (0.761) (0.654) (0.330) (0.711)
Threshold 1 -0.143 -0.068 0.133 -0.160 0.284 879
(1.058) (0.591) (0.419) (0.224) (0.641)
Threshold 2 0.048 -0.730 -0.230 -0.058 -0.967 742
(0.927) (0.562) (0.451) (0.250) (0.652)
Threshold 3 0.773 0.679 0.224 0.018 0.244 765
(0.862) (0.420) (0.328) (0.159) (0.501)
Notes. Discontinuity of pre-treatment town characteristics (from the 1980 Census) at the FPM thresholds, estimated as the
jump of a (split) third-order polynomial around pooled thresholds (i.e., with population normalized as the distance from
the above or below threshold; symmetric intervals with no municipality in more than one interval) or around individual
thresholds. All variables are per capita and measure average employment; refrigerator, radio, or car ownership; house access
to water and sewer. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
49Table 7 – Budget Elasticities with respect to Theoretical Transfers
Total Local Total Infrastructure Personnel Obs.
revenues taxes expenditure expenditure expenditure
Thresholds 1–7 0.527*** -0.700*** 0.479*** 0.708*** 0.336*** 2,788
(0.108) (0.253) (0.108) (0.218) (0.120)
Thresholds 1–3 0.627*** -0.711** 0.587*** 1.017*** 0.442*** 2,133
(0.130) (0.299) (0.132) (0.278) (0.146)
Threshold 1 0.717*** -0.693* 0.637*** 1.176*** 0.391** 1,199
(0.184) (0.421) (0.186) (0.445) (0.195)
Threshold 2 0.511** -1.321*** 0.513** 1.233** 0.228 931
(0.227) (0.479) (0.238) (0.573) (0.245)
Threshold 3 0.866*** -1.072* 0.902*** 1.589*** 0.521 934
(0.285) (0.648) (0.275) (0.515) (0.318)
Notes. Elasticities of (self-reported) revenues and expenditure variables with respect to theoretical transfers, estimated as
the log-version of equation (30). All variables are expressed in Brazilian reais at 2000 prices. Mayoral terms 2001–2005
and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Table 8 – Reduced-Form Eﬀects: FPM Transfers and Corruption Measures
FPM Broad Narrow No. of broad No. of narrow Obs.
transfers corruption corruption corruption corruption
episodes episodes
Thresholds 1–7 0.553*** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.012 0.033** 606
(0.054) (0.007) (0.008) (0.027) (0.016)
Thresholds 1–3 0.599*** 0.030*** 0.022** 0.024 0.037* 464
(0.075) (0.009) (0.010) (0.037) (0.022)
Threshold 1 0.564*** 0.013 -0.001 0.092 0.021 251
(0.118) (0.019) (0.018) (0.057) (0.037)
Threshold 2 0.707*** 0.043*** 0.030** 0.132* 0.056 227
(0.107) (0.016) (0.015) (0.073) (0.043)
Threshold 3 0.703*** 0.032** 0.039** -0.008 0.061* 213
(0.159) (0.014) (0.015) (0.067) (0.036)
Notes. Reduced-form eﬀects of theoretical transfers on actual FPM transfers and corruption measures, estimated as in
equations (30)-(31). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
50Table 9 – IV Estimates: Corruption Measures
Broad Narrow No. of broad No. of narrow Obs.
corruption corruption corruption corruption
episodes episodes
Thresholds 1–7 0.038*** 0.032** 0.022 0.060** 606
(0.013) (0.014) (0.047) (0.028)
Thresholds 1–3 0.050*** 0.037** 0.039 0.062* 464
(0.016) (0.017) (0.060) (0.036)
Threshold 1 0.023 -0.001 0.163* 0.036 251
(0.032) (0.031) (0.099) (0.063)
Threshold 2 0.061** 0.043** 0.187* 0.079 227
(0.024) (0.021) (0.103) (0.059)
Threshold 3 0.044** 0.054** -0.011 0.084* 213
(0.020) (0.022) (0.088) (0.047)
Notes. Eﬀects of FPM transfers (instrumented with theoretical transfers) on corruption measures, estimated as in equation
(33). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
51Table 10 – Robustness Checks: Corruption Measures
Broad Narrow No. of broad No. of narrow Obs.
corruption corruption corruption corruption
episodes episodes
Spline (3rd-order) polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 0.039** 0.028* 0.032 0.057* 606
(0.016) (0.016) (0.057) (0.033)
Thresholds 1–3 0.049*** 0.035* 0.056 0.052 464
(0.018) (0.018) (0.066) (0.037)
2nd-order polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.028 0.051** 606
(0.012) (0.012) (0.039) (0.024)
Thresholds 1–3 0.043*** 0.037** 0.039 0.062* 464
(0.015) (0.016) (0.055) (0.034)
Spline (2nd-order) polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.022 0.072** 606
(0.015) (0.015) (0.053) (0.031)
Thresholds 1–3 0.048*** 0.044** 0.036 0.065* 464
(0.016) (0.018) (0.060) (0.037)
4th-order polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 0.037*** 0.028** 0.017 0.051* 606
(0.013) (0.014) (0.049) (0.029)
Thresholds 1–3 0.050*** 0.038** 0.038 0.063* 464
(0.016) (0.017) (0.060) (0.035)
Spline (4th-order) polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 0.033** 0.031** 0.029 0.064** 606
(0.015) (0.015) (0.049) (0.028)
Thresholds 1–3 0.047*** 0.026 0.054 0.042 464
(0.018) (0.019) (0.066) (0.038)
Spline (3rd-order) polynomial including 10,000
Thresholds 1–7 0.039** 0.029* 0.022 0.053* 606
(0.016) (0.016) (0.057) (0.032)
Thresholds 1–3 0.024** 0.019* -0.014 0.031 464
(0.011) (0.011) (0.043) (0.023)
Spline (3rd-order) polynomial above 10,000
Thresholds 1–7 0.055*** 0.040** 0.038 0.066* 491
(0.020) (0.019) (0.066) (0.039)
Thresholds 1–3 0.061*** 0.039* 0.057 0.044 349
(0.022) (0.021) (0.074) (0.043)
Notes. Eﬀects of FPM transfers (instrumented with theoretical transfers) on corruption measures, estimated as in equation
(33) adjusting the functional form of G(Pi) as speciﬁed, or restricting the sample above 10,000 (wage threshold). Mayoral
terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at
the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
52Table 11 – Placebo Tests: Corruption Measures
Broad Narrow No. of broad No. of narrow Obs.
corruption corruption corruption corruption
episodes episodes
Thresholds 1–7 0.009 0.095 0.254 0.171 543
(0.074) (0.081) (0.270) (0.165)
Thresholds 1–3 0.019 0.177 0.111 0.189 401
(0.103) (0.116) (0.387) (0.220)
Threshold 1 0.049 0.116 -0.051 0.018 241
(0.143) (0.160) (0.548) (0.312)
Threshold 2 -0.132 -0.202 0.230 -0.436 226
(0.155) (0.166) (0.621) (0.322)
Threshold 3 -0.134 0.301* -0.180 0.500 198
(0.170) (0.179) (0.522) (0.357)
Notes. Discontinuityof corruption measures at fake thresholds (i.e., midpoints between the true FPM thresholds), estimated
as the jump of a (split) third-orderpolynomialaround the (fake) pooledthresholdsor around the (fake) individualthresholds.
Midpoints are: 1st) 11,887; 2nd) 15,283; 3rd) 20,337; 4th) 27,169; 5th) 33,961; 6th) 40,753; and 7th) 47,545 . Mayoral terms
2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Table 12 – Reduced-Form Eﬀects: FPM Transfers, Opponents’ Characteristics, and
Election Outcome
FPM College Years of High-skilled Incumbent Obs.
transfers schooling occupation reelection
Thresholds 1–7 0.732*** -0.007** -0.059*** -0.002 0.009*** 2,788
(0.025) (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003)
Thresholds 1–3 0.667*** -0.011*** -0.100*** -0.007 0.010** 2,133
(0.025) (0.004) (0.031) (0.004) (0.005)
Threshold 1 0.566*** -0.021*** -0.169*** -0.013 0.020** 1,199
(0.045) (0.007) (0.059) (0.008) (0.009)
Threshold 2 0.674*** -0.005 -0.091 0.004 0.005 931
(0.050) (0.008) (0.062) (0.008) (0.009)
Threshold 3 0.694*** -0.003 -0.057 -0.012* 0.012 934
(0.050) (0.007) (0.049) (0.007) (0.008)
Notes. Reduced-form eﬀects of theoretical transfers on actual FPM transfers, characteristics of the pool of opponents, and
the incumbent mayor’s reelection probability, estimated as in equations (30)-(31). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
53Table 13 – IV Estimates: Opponents’ Characteristics and Election Outcome
College Years of High-skilled Incumbent Obs.
schooling occupation reelection
Thresholds 1–7 -0.009** -0.080*** -0.002 0.012*** 2,788
(0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.005)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.017*** -0.150*** -0.010 0.015** 2,133
(0.006) (0.046) (0.006) (0.007)
Threshold 1 -0.037*** -0.298*** -0.023* 0.036** 1,199
(0.014) (0.108) (0.014) (0.016)
Threshold 2 -0.008 -0.134 0.006 0.007 931
(0.011) (0.091) (0.011) (0.014)
Threshold 3 -0.004 -0.082 -0.018* 0.017 934
(0.010) (0.070) (0.010) (0.012)
Notes. Eﬀects of FPM transfers (instrumented with theoretical transfers) on the characteristics of the pool of opponents
and the incumbent mayor’s reelection probability, estimated as in equation (33). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
54Table 14 – Robustness Checks: Opponents’ Characteristics and Election Outcome
College Years of High-skilled Incumbent Obs.
schooling occupation reelection
Spline (3rd-order) polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 -0.011** -0.088*** -0.003 0.009 2,788
(0.004) (0.030) (0.004) (0.005)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.020*** -0.161*** -0.012* 0.015* 2,133
(0.007) (0.051) (0.007) (0.008)
2nd-order polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 -0.008** -0.069*** -0.001 0.012*** 2,788
(0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.004)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.014** -0.129*** -0.007 0.019*** 2,133
(0.006) (0.040) (0.005) (0.006)
Spline (2nd-order) polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 -0.010** -0.082*** -0.003 0.009* 2,788
(0.004) (0.029) (0.004) (0.005)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.018*** -0.153*** -0.011* 0.016** 2,133
(0.007) (0.048) (0.007) (0.008)
4th-order polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 -0.010*** -0.083*** -0.002 0.012*** 2,788
(0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.005)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.017*** -0.154*** -0.011* 0.016** 2,133
(0.006) (0.047) (0.006) (0.007)
Spline (4th-order) polynomial
Thresholds 1–7 -0.009** -0.079** -0.006 0.009 2,788
(0.005) (0.032) (0.005) (0.006)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.020*** -0.160*** -0.013* 0.017** 2,133
(0.008) (0.054) (0.007) (0.009)
Spline (3rd-order) polynomial including 10,000
Thresholds 1–7 -0.011** -0.093*** -0.004 0.008 2,788
(0.005) (0.031) (0.004) (0.005)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.018** -0.174*** -0.014* 0.012 2,133
(0.007) (0.054) (0.007) (0.009)
Spline (3rd-order) polynomial above 10,000
Thresholds 1–7 -0.004 -0.041 -0.001 0.008 2,138
(0.005) (0.036) (0.005) (0.007)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.008 -0.115* -0.008 0.013 1,483
(0.009) (0.067) (0.009) (0.011)
Notes. Eﬀects of FPM transfers (instrumented with theoretical transfers) on the characteristics of the pool of opponents and
the incumbent mayor’s reelectionprobability, estimated as in equation(33) adjusting the functionalform of G(Pi) as speciﬁed,
or restricting the sample above 10,000 (wage threshold). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
55Table 15 – IV Estimates: Politicians’ Characteristics in All Municipalities
College Years of High-skilled Obs.
schooling occupation
Panel A
Thresholds 1–7 -0.011** -0.087*** -0.001 2,788
(0.005) (0.032) (0.005)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.015** -0.151*** -0.010 2,133
(0.008) (0.055) (0.007)
Threshold 1 -0.037** -0.430*** -0.016 1,199
(0.016) (0.131) (0.016)
Threshold 2 -0.015 -0.174 0.008 931
(0.014) (0.107) (0.014)
Threshold 3 -0.002 -0.049 -0.025** 934
(0.013) (0.084) (0.013)
Panel B
Thresholds 1–7 -0.004 -0.063*** 0.003 5,452
(0.003) (0.019) (0.003)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.010** -0.109*** 0.000 4,177
(0.004) (0.030) (0.004)
Threshold 1 -0.017** -0.171** -0.004 2,360
(0.009) (0.067) (0.009)
Threshold 2 -0.004 -0.113* 0.012 1,799
(0.008) (0.058) (0.008)
Threshold 3 -0.004 -0.079* -0.002 1,817
(0.007) (0.047) (0.007)
Panel C
Thresholds 1–7 -0.004 -0.059*** 0.002 5,281
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003)
Thresholds 1–3 -0.010** -0.107*** -0.002 4,027
(0.004) (0.031) (0.004)
Threshold 1 -0.016* -0.181** -0.007 2,267
(0.009) (0.071) (0.009)
Threshold 2 -0.006 -0.107* 0.009 1,745
(0.008) (0.061) (0.008)
Threshold 3 -0.004 -0.075 -0.004 1,760
(0.007) (0.050) (0.007)
Notes. Same estimations as in Table 13 but with diﬀerent samples. Panel A considers only the
opponents (of the incumbent who runs for reelection) with the highest number of votes. Panel B
considers all candidates in municipalities where the incumbent does not run for reelection and all
opponents in municipalities where the incumbent reruns. Panel C considers all the opponents of
the political party of the incumbent mayor (irrespective of whether the incumbent reruns or not).
Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at
the 1% level by ***.
56Table 16 – Placebo Tests: Opponents’ Characteristics and Election Outcome
College Years of High-skilled Incumbent Obs.
schooling occupation reelection
Thresholds 1–7 0.015 0.193 0.018 -0.048 2,430
(0.033) (0.232) (0.033) (0.040)
Thresholds 1–3 0.021 0.127 0.010 0.004 1,775
(0.047) (0.335) (0.047) (0.057)
Threshold 1 0.016 0.746 -0.007 -0.011 1,066
(0.069) (0.511) (0.071) (0.082)
Threshold 2 -0.017 -0.167 -0.008 -0.062 953
(0.066) (0.460) (0.067) (0.082)
Threshold 3 0.033 -0.018 0.108 0.008 864
(0.069) (0.503) (0.069) (0.086)
Notes. Discontinuity of the political selection variables at fake thresholds (i.e., midpoints between the true FPM thresholds),
estimated as the jump of a (split) third-order polynomial around the (fake) pooled thresholds or around the (fake) individual
thresholds. Midpoints are: 1st) 11,887; 2nd) 15,283; 3rd) 20,337; 4th) 27,169; 5th) 33,961; 6th) 40,753; and 7th) 47,545
. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
57Table 17 – Opponents’ Characteristics and Corruption Measures
Broad Narrow No. of broad No. of narrow
corruption corruption corruption corruption
episodes episodes
Thresholds 1–7 (Obs. 229)
Years of schooling -0.011 -0.016 0.011 0.033
(0.017) (0.016) (0.053) (0.029)
College 0.141 0.135 0.164 -0.072
0.129) (0.125) (0.385) (0.263)
High-skilled -0.110 -0.072 -0.053 -0.063
(0.075) (0.080) (0.222) (0.138)
Thresholds 1–3 (Obs. 179)
Years of schooling -0.028 -0.014 -0.006 0.045
(0.017) (0.018) (0.059) (0.032)
College 0.216* 0.106 0.017 -0.249
(0.130) (0.146) (0.423) (0.288)
High-skilled -0.204** -0.082 -0.149 -0.116
(0.079) (0.092) (0.240) (0.149)
Notes. Probit (ﬁrst and second corruption measures) and OLS (third and fourth corruption measures) estimations of the
correlation between corruption and opponents’ characteristics; marginal eﬀects reported. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and
2005–2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
58Table 18 – Opponents’ Characteristics and the Impact of Transfers on Corruption
Broad Narrow No. of broad No. of narrow
corruption corruption corruption corruption
episodes episodes
INTERACTION WITH COLLEGE:
Thresholds 1–7 (Obs. 229)
Interaction -0.002 -0.006 0.003 -0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (0.016)
FPM 0.029* 0.030 0.021 0.058
(0.017) (0.018) (0.060) (0.037)
Thresholds 1–3 (Obs. 179)
Interaction -0.021* -0.025** -0.095*** -0.064**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.033) (0.025)
FPM 0.051** 0.039 0.098 0.114**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.089) (0.058)
INTERACTION WITH YEARS OF SCHOOLING:
Thresholds 1–7 (Obs. 229)
Interaction 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
FPM 0.024 0.032 0.018 0.065
(0.023) (0.022) (0.077) (0.045)
Thresholds 1–3 (Obs. 179)
Interaction -0.002 -0.001 -0.011** -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
FPM 0.072* 0.049 0.198 0.148*
(0.039) (0.036) (0.128) (0.081)
INTERACTION WITH HIGH-SKILLED OCCUPATION:
Thresholds 1–7 (Obs. 229)
Interaction 0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.023) (0.016)
FPM 0.026 0.029 0.026 0.059
(0.017) (0.018) (0.056) (0.036)
Thresholds 1–3 (Obs. 179)
Interaction -0.020 -0.027** -0.079** -0.077***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.033) (0.025)
FPM 0.057** 0.048* 0.116 0.139**
(0.025) (0.027) (0.091) (0.059)
Notes. Eﬀects of FPM transfers and their interaction with each opponents’ characteristic (instrumented with theoretical
transfers and their interaction with each opponents’ characteristic). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the
5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.











































































































10189 13585 16981 23773 30565 37356 44148
Population
Notes. Top panel: scatterplotof actual FPM transfers versuspopulationsize (left); scatterplotaveragedover 100-inhabitantbins
plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval between two consecutive thresholds (right). Bottom panel:
scatterplotof theoreticaltransfers versus populationsize (left); scatterplotaveraged over 100-inhabitantbins plus running-mean
smoothing performed separately in each interval between two consecutive thresholds (right). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and
2005–2009.






























































































































































10189 13585 16981 23773 30565 37356 44148
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Notes. Top panel: scatterplot of actual FPM transfers per capita versus population size (left); scatterplot averaged over
100-inhabitant bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval between two consecutive thresholds
(right). Bottom panel: scatterplot of theoretical transfers per capita versus population size (left); scatterplot averaged over
100-inhabitant bins plus running-mean smoothing performed separately in each interval between two consecutive thresholds
(right). Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.


























Notes. Frequency of cities according to population size. Cities below 50,941 inhabitants only. The vertical lines identify the
ﬁrst seven FPM revenue-sharing thresholds. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
62Figure 4 – McCrary Density Tests: Pooled and Individual Thresholds
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Threshold 4
−4000 −2000 0 2000 4000
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−4000 −2000 0 2000 4000
Threshold 6
−4000 −2000 0 2000 4000
Threshold 7
Notes. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density (according to population size), performed separately on either side of each
pooled or individual FPM revenue-sharing threshold. Optimal binwidth and binsize as in McCrary (2008). Large sample with
political selection variables. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
63Figure 5 – McCrary Density Tests: Pooled Threshold Year by Year
−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Year 2000
−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Year 2001
−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Year 2002
−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Year 2004
−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Year 2005
−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Year 2006
Notes. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density (according to population size), performed separately on either side of the
pooled FPM revenue-sharing threshold (1–7) for each year in the sample period. Optimal binwidth and binsize as in McCrary
(2008). Large sample with political selection variables. Mayoral terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
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Notes. The solid line is a split third-order polynomial in population size, ﬁtted separately on each side of the pooled FPM
thresholds at zero (population size is normalized as the distance from the above or below threshold; symmetric intervals with
no municipality in more than one interval). The dashed lines are the 95% conﬁdence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points
are averaged over 250-unit intervals. Small sample with corruption variables (530 obs.). Terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
































































































































−4000 −2000 0 2000 4000
Population
Notes. The solid line is a split third-order polynomial in population size, ﬁtted separately on each side of the pooled FPM
thresholds at zero (populationsize is normalized as the distance from the above or below threshold; symmetric intervals with no
municipality in more than one interval). The dashed lines are the 95% conﬁdence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are
averaged over 250-unit intervals. Large sample with political selection variables (2,430 obs.). Terms 2001–2005 and 2005–2009.
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